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Empowerment for the Pursuit of
Happiness: Parents with Disabilities and
the Americans with Disabilities Act
Dave Shade*
Grief fills the room up of my absent child,
Lies in his bed, walks up and down with me,
Puts on his pretty looks, repeats his words,
Remembers me of all his gracious parts,
Stuffs out his vacant garments with his form...
O Lord! My boy, my Arthur, my fair son!
My life, my joy, my food, my all the world!
My widow-comfort, and my sorrows' cure!1
Introduction
The right to establish a home and raise children is among the
most basic of civil rights, long recognized as essential to the or-
derly pursuit of happiness. 2 Cherished as this right may be, how-
ever, it has been violated, abused or just ignored for people with
disabilities. 3 Although persons with disabilities have made signifi-
* J.D. University of Maryland School of Law; B.A. Biomedical Engineering,
Johns Hopkins University. The author gratefully recognizes the important contri-
butions made by his family and by Professor Stan Herr, Professor Jana Singer and
the editors of Law & Inequality.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING JOHN, act 3, sc. 4 (David Bevington ed., Ban-
tam Books 1988) (1594). Few experiences elicit devastation as universal as that
evoked by the loss of parenthood.
2. See Rosemary Shaw Sackett, Terminating Parental Rights of the Handi-
capped, 25 FAM. L.Q. 253, 258 (1991) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (holding that a state law forbidding the teaching of any modern language,
other than English, to any child who has not passed the eighth grade, invades the
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment); In re Carmaleta B., 579 P.2d
514 (Cal. 1978) (holding that parenting is a fundamental right which may be dis-
turbed only in extreme cases where the parent or parents act in a fashion incom-
patible with parenthood); In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1974) (holding that a juve-
nile court may award custody of a child to a nonparent only upon a clear showing
that such award is essential to avert harm to the child)).
3. Numerous examples will be developed, infra Part I.B. There may be no
clear preference for the proper language to be used when referring to people with
disabilities. In fact, in 1991, a New York foundation sponsored a $50,000 contest
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cant gains in recent years in overcoming the invidious discrimina-
tion with which they have long been burdened, 4 the legal rights of
parents5 with disabilities remain in question. Because society
places so much importance on protecting the children involved in
any evaluation of parental fitness, 6 the tension between parent,
child, and government offers fertile ground for the abuse of the
family headed by one or more parents with disability.
This Article argues that the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA),7 signed by President Bush on July 26, 1990, offers parents
with disabilities significant empowerment with which they may
secure this sacred trapping of liberty. Part I of this Article begins
by reviewing the basic rights afforded to parents by the Constitu-
tion and describes the restrictions imposed on states when they in-
for the "best" phrase to describe the abilities of people with disabilities. See Jane
West, The Evolution of Disability Rights, in IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS 3, 10
(Lawrence 0. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTING THE
ADA]. The "people first" approach, that is, to refer to any group of individuals by
starting with reference to their personhood, before reference to the other charac-
teristics that link them with the group (i.e. "persons with disability" instead of
"disabled"), is perhaps most widely accepted. However, one prominent disabled
woman, Judith Heumann, has criticized the "people first" approach and argues
that the term "disabled" may be preferable. See Judith E. Heumann, Building Our
Own Boats: A Personal Perspective on Disability Policy, in IMPLEMENTING THE
ADA, supra, at 251, 262.
This Article will generally use the "person first" approach, except when the
context requires otherwise or when the subject or object has expressed a desire for
a different reference form. Any reference to the population of persons without dis-
ability, however, will generally use the term "nondisabled" as opposed to "person
without disability." The nondisabled, as a group, have not been subjected to the
long history of discrimination that has been visited upon persons with disabilities,
and to the extent that a violation of the "people first" rule serves to highlight this
fact, any offense should be well taken.
This Article will also interchange the terms "persons" and "people" and the
terms "with disability" and "with disabilities." The occasional use of the construc-
tion "persons with disability" instead of "persons with disabilities" is intended to
evoke some sense of the condition of disability as separate and distinct from the
individual impairments that may create disability. Cancer, alcoholism, and
schizophrenia may all be managed or controlled in some people, but the affected
individuals may still live "with disability" even when they are free of symptoms for
long periods of time.
4. See infra Part II (explaining causes of action under the ADA).
5. For purposes of this Article, the terms "parent" and "parents" may be used
interchangeably to refer to a single parent or a couple, married or unmarried, with
one or more children. In addition, both terms may refer either to one or more per-
sons who already have children, or to a person or persons presently trying to have
children via unaided conception, medical intervention, or adoption. Thus, the term
"parent" may refer to one or more present parents, prospective parents, or some
combination of both (as in the case of a parent who has a child and is attempting to
have another).
6. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
7. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
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terfere with those rights. In addition, Part I describes the avail-
able evidence demonstrating that parents with disabilities can
successfully raise their children, despite their many differing abili-
ties. Finally, Part I introduces a framework that may prove help-
ful in subsequent analyses. Part II presents the ADA and de-
scribes its multi-faceted approach to attacking discrimination
faced by persons with disabilities. Parts III and IV apply the ADA
to some of the contexts in which parents with disabilities may face
discrimination. This analysis, however, is limited to those contexts
in which the purported discrimination is based on concerns about
parental unfitness, as opposed to other forms of discrimination
that happen to be directed at a parent with disability. Part III fo-
cuses on parenting contexts in which the formation of the family is
at issue by analyzing possible applications of the ADA to the areas
of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) and adoption. Part IV
focuses on parenting contexts in which the family has already been
formed but is threatened by state action, such as when the state
seeks a termination of parental rights (TPR). This Article argues
that while the ADA does not foreclose all opportunities for dis-
crimination directed against parents with disabilities, it does offer
those parents significant empowerment for the self-protection of
their parental rights.
I. Parents' Rights
A. Constitutional Protections of Parents'Rights
Perhaps the seminal statement on the Constitution's protec-
tions for the rights of parents comes from the United States Su-
preme Court's description of the Fourteenth Amendment in Meyer
v. Nebraska:8
While this Court has not attempted to define ["liberty"] with
exactness . . . the term has received much consideration....
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint but also the right of the individual to contract, to en-
gage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire use-
ful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recog-
nized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.9
8. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
9. Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
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Subsequent decisions have further defined the contours of the
law's protection of parental rights. Pierce v. Society of Sisters'o
reaffirmed the liberty interest held by "parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control."" In Ginsberg v. New York,12 the Court observed that
"constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the
rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society."' 3
The importance of parents' rights is hard to overstate. As the
Court said in Stanley v. Illinois:14 "[tihe rights to conceive and to
raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights
of man,' and '[nlights far more precious.., than property rights."' 15
In 1972, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 16 the Court invalidated a Wisconsin
law that compelled Amish children to attend school, ruling that
the strong state interest in the compulsory schooling of children
must fail when balanced against "the rights of parents to direct the
religious upbringing of their children."'17 Most recently, in 1978,
the Court, quoting its opinion in Prince v. Massachusetts,'1 said
"[flt is cardinal with us that 'the custody, care and nurture of the
child resides first with the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder."' 19
However, it is equally well recognized that parents' tremen-
dous liberty interests in children are neither absolute nor unas-
sailable. "To be sure, the power of the parents... may be subject
to limitation... if it appears that parental decisions will jeopard-
ize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for signifi-
cant social burdens."2 0 Under their parens patriae power, states
claim the authority to protect the "best interests" of children by
limiting, and, under extreme circumstances, severing the parents'
rights. 21 Most frequently, "extreme circumstances" involve in-
10. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
11. Id. at 534-35.
12. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
13. Id. at 639.
14. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
15. Id. at 651 (citations omitted).
16. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
17. Id. at 233.
18. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
19. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
20. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34.
21. See ROBERT L. BURGDORF, JR., THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED
PERSONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT 948 (1980).
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stances of child abuse and neglect.2 2 Balancing the interests of
children against the interests of parents in deciding cases of abuse
and neglect is difficult and delicate. The Supreme Court has de-
termined that the Constitution calls for the balance to be struck by
requiring states, in cases of child neglect, to prove by "clear and
convincing evidence" the need for the termination of parental
rights (TPR).23 In most cases, the termination of parental rights
on the basis of neglect requires satisfaction of two general ele-
ments: one, that the TPR be in the child's "best interests"; and
two, that the parents possess a degree of culpability.24 Often, the
child is placed in foster care25 until the parents regain custody
(assuming there is no TPR), the child reaches the age of majority,
or the child is adopted.26
As might be expected, the tension between protecting chil-
dren and preserving parents' rights results in a great deal of con-
troversy. Children's rights advocates argue that the "clear and
convincing" standard does too little to protect children, who may
be harmed by staying in a dangerous home any longer than neces-
sary. They support a standard in which the state would be re-
quired to demonstrate the need for a TPR only by a
"preponderance of the evidence."27 On the other hand, parents'
rights advocates argue that the higher "beyond a reasonable
22. See id.
23. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
24. See, e.g., MARK HARDEN & ROBERT LANCOUR, EARLY TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS: DEVELOPING APPROPRIATE STATUTORY GROUNDS 20 (1996). Pa-
rental fault need not necessarily be volitional. See id. at 11.
25. In this Article foster care refers to the placement of the child in a tempo-
rary home. The foster parents, while exercising day-to-day control over the child,
do not stand in the place of the child's parents; the state retains that responsibil-
ity. Most foster parents receive a monthly payment in return for their service.
The foster care system, in which the state asserts responsibility for the child,
has been the subject of growing concern and there have been many calls for its re-
form. See Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV.
423 (1983) (proposing a new standard for parental rights termination in which a
court may not consider termination unless it has first deprived the natural parent
of legal custody and appointed a permanent guardian; even then, the court may
not terminate other parental rights unless it finds that the child would suffer spe-
cific, significant harm which cannot be averted by any less drastic alternative).
26. TPR is not the only process by which children may enter the foster care
system. In fact, in many states children are placed into foster care before the ini-
tiation of TPR proceedings. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-814
(1995). In some states, TPR proceedings are contemporaneous with the adoption
of the child. That is, a neglected child may remain in foster care without the ter-
mination of the parents' rights until prospective adoptive parents are located. See,
e.g., id.; FAM. LAW § 5-312 (Supp. 1996).
27. See Catherine B. Gabriels, Santosky v. Kramer: Due Process and the Inter-
est of the Child in Permanent Neglect Proceedings, 47 ALB. L. REV. 680 (1983).
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doubt" standard is needed to protect parents who would lose their
children merely because a "better" home is available. 28 Moreover,
controversy also surrounds the standards by which the courts
measure the "need" for a TPR proceeding. 29 That is, must the par-
ents commit some affirmative wrong for the state to remove a
child? Both these issues, the substantive standards and the degree
of proof, remain contentious, and the law in this area continues to
evolve.
B. Parents with Disabilities
Data on parents with disabilities are difficult to find.30 Peo-
ple with disabilities have been called America's largest minority
group, 31 but no one knows how many people with disabilities are
becoming parents.3 2 However, it is known that parents with dis-
abilities encounter difficulty and prejudice. Several recent inci-
dents received widespread media attention. In one, Tiffany Cao,
a California woman with cerebral palsy 33 who was confined to a
wheelchair, agreed to relinquish her two children after local
authorities threatened to remove them. 34 In another, county social
workers in Michigan denied assistance to Leigh Campbell-Earl
and Bill Earl, both with cerebral palsy, after the couple called their
local social services agency for help in caring for their child.35
County social services told the couple that no financial help exists
for nondisabled children. 36 Moreover, the social services agency
warned the Earls that their baby would be removed if they were
unable to provide appropriate care.37
28. See Patricia J. Falk, Why Not Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?, 62 NEB. L.
REV. 602 (1983).
29. See HARDEN & LANcouR, supra note 24, at 20.
30. See Jay Mathews, Custody Battle: The Disabled Fight to Raise Their Chil-
dren, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1992, at Zl0.
31. See id. In 1990, Congress found that at least 43,000,000 Americans had
one or more physical or mental disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994).
32. See Mathews, supra note 30, at Z10.
33. As is common for people with cerebral palsy, Ms. Callo was originally la-
beled as "mentally retarded," a fact that resurfaced and was used against her
during her struggles to keep her children. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id. Even though the agency denied the Earls assistance with their
baby, the county provided the couple with sophisticated voice computers, wheel-
chairs, and other aids and services. See All Things Considered: Disabled Parents
Without Aid for Well Kids (NPR radio broadcast, July 15, 1992) (transcript avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Script File).




The prejudices faced by parents with disabilities are severe.
In the famous case of In re Carney,38 the California Supreme Court
reversed the trial court's decision to award custody of a man's chil-
dren to the man's former wife solely because he had become con-
fined to a wheelchair. 39 Although it was overturned, the trial
court's decision paints an all-too-familiar picture of the parent
with a disability: unable to provide care, unable to provide love,
unable to be a parent.40 This picture demonstrates 'a judicial pre-
sumption of unfitness in many cases involving child custody for
handicapped parents."'41 This presumption manifests itself differ-
ently depending upon the disability: "deaf parents are thought to
be incapable of effectively stimulating language skills; blind par-
ents cannot provide adequate attention or discipline; and parents
with spinal cord injuries cannot adequately supervise their chil-
dren."42  Parents with mental disability may face even greater
prejudice, 43 notwithstanding an estimated 20,000 births that occur
each year to women who have mental retardation.44 In specifying
grounds for the termination of parental rights, many states' stat-
utes list mental illness or mental retardation as specific grounds
for the termination of the parent's rights,45 some include physical
disability,46 and others simply list "disability" as a grounds for
termination without defining or explaining the appropriate use of
the term in this context. 47
38. 598 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1979).
39. See id. at 37.
40. The trial judge in Carney seemed most concerned with the fact that the
father would be unable to participate in sports with his children. See id. at 40.
41. Michael Ashley Stein, Mommy Has a Blue Wheelchair: Recognizing the Pa-
rental Rights of Individuals with Disabilities, 60 BROO. L. REV. 1069, 1082-83
(quoting lAURA A. ROTHSTEIN, RIGHTS OF PHYSIcALLY HANDICAPPED PERSONS 185
(1984)).
42. Id. at 1083.
43. The nation's long and unfortunate history (perhaps not ended) with the
involuntary sterilization of individuals (mostly women) with mental disability has
been described well elsewhere. See, e.g., MENTAL RETARDATION AND STERILIZATION
(Ruth Macklin & Willard Gaylin eds., 1981) (explaining the matter of sterilization,
whether voluntary or involuntary, of the mentally incompetent).
44. See News: Struggle to Be Normal, Part 3 - Retarded Parents (CNN televi-
sion broadcast, Sept. 28, 1994) (transcript available in LEXIS, News Library,
Script File).
45. See Joseph R. Carrieri, Gregory IK: A Termination of Parental Rights Case,
N.Y. LAW J., Oct. 8, 1992, at 1 (citing ALA. CODE § 26-18-7(a)(2) (1992); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-3-604 (Supp. 1996); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-51 (1993); N.Y. SOC. SERV.
L. § 384-b (1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511(a) (1991)).
46. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1583(b)(1) (1994); LA. CH. CODE art.
1003(10)(c) (1995).
47. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-313(d)(i) (Supp. 1996).
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Although there may be legitimate concerns about the abilities
of some of these parents, it is useful to begin any study of parent-
ing abilities with the wisdom of the reviewing court in Carney:
Contemporary psychology confirms what wise families have
perhaps always known-that the essence of parenting is not to
be found in the harried rounds of daily carpooling endemic to
modern suburban life, or even in the doggedly dutiful acts of
"togetherness" committed every weekend by well-meaning fa-
thers and mothers across America. Rather, its essence lies in
the ethical, emotional, and intellectual guidance the parent
gives to the child throughout his formative years, and often
beyond. The source of this guidance is the adult's own experi-
ence of life; its motive power is parental love and concern for
the child's well-being; and its teachings deal with such fun-
damental matters as the child's feelings about himself, his
relationships with others, his system of values, his standards
of conduct, and his goals and priorities in life .... [H]owever
limited his bodily strength may be, a handicapped parent is a
whole person to the child who needs his affection, sympathy,
and wisdom to deal with the problems of growing up. 48
Regrettably, there is far too little research on parenting with a
disability. The available evidence suggests that although parents
with disabilities may have a very different approach to parenting,49
the presence of a disability (physical or mental) is a poor correlate
of long-term maladjustment in children. 50 In a study of parents
with mental retardation, the single best correlate of "well-
adjusted" children 51 was the availability of support services. 52
48. In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 44 (Cal. 1979). Note that even this
sensitive judge felt it necessary to restrict his comments to parents with physical
disabilities, excluding parents with mental disabilities.
49. For example, a parent with limited upper body mobility might take much
longer to change her baby's diaper than a parent with no disability. However, it
would be a mistake to conclude that this "difference" was a detriment to the baby.
In the case of Tiffany Callo, see supra text accompanying notes 33-34, who did re-
quire much longer to change her baby, one reviewing expert concluded that the
baby adapted extremely well to the difference, and that, in fact, the extra time
spent by the mother with her baby could very well be a benefit. See Mathews, su-
pra note 30, at Z10.
50. See Barbara Y. Whitman et al., Training in Parenting Skills for Adults
with Mental Retardation, 34 Soc. WORK 431, 433 (1989) (noting that there are
many cases where parents with disabilities have been successfully taught how to
perform certain tasks for children that they otherwise would not have been able to
perform because of their disability); Steven A. Rosenberg & Gay Angel McTate,
Intellectually Handicapped Mothers: Problems and Prospects, CHILDREN TODAY,
Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 24 (explaining that IQ is not a good predictor of parenting abil-
ity).
51. The term "well-adjusted child" is difficult to define.
52. See Maurice A. Feldman et al., Parent Education Project I: Development &
Nurturance of Children of Mentally Retarded Parents, 90 J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY
253, 258 (1985) (stating that there is no correlation between mother's I.Q. and
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Thus, although the data are far from clear, it seems safe to
conclude that many parents with disabilities previously thought
unable to raise a child at all may actually be able to do so, and that
many more parents with disabilities may succeed in raising their
children if provided appropriate support services.5 3
C. A Proposed Analytical Framework
To aid in the process of evaluating parental abilities, this Ar-
ticle proposes the following analytical framework. The framework
divides parents into three categories: parents who cannot be suit-
able,5 4 no matter how much help or assistance they receive ("never
suitable"); parents who require no assistance to be suitable
("always suitable"); 55 and parents who may be unsuitable without
support services, but who can, with the provision of appropriate
services, become or remain suitable ("suitable with help").5 6 The
task in any parental fitness evaluation is first, to categorize the
parent properly; and second, if the parent is found to belong in the
"suitable with help" category, to identify the services necessary to
keep the parent suitable. The first step may sometimes prove dif-
ficult, even for the most open-minded evaluator, when faced with
the task of assessing parents with severe disabilities. Our society
is only now learning to understand the different approaches and
abilities of people with disabilities. Many people would probably
feel uncomfortable, for example, concluding that a blind parent
could ever be suitable, and many more would resist classifying as
suitable a parent with mental illness or retardation. Yet, it is un-
child neglect until mother's I.Q. falls under 60); Audrey Myerson O'Neill, Normal
and Bright Children of Mentally Retarded Parents: The Huck Finn Syndrome, 15
CHILD PSYCHIATRY & HUM. DEV. 255, 267 (1985) (arguing that the parent's I.Q., or
other indices of mental ability, is not a good predictor of a child's adjustment until
the parent's I.Q. falls under 60).
53. The ability to procure appropriate support services should increase with
the socio-economic status of the individual or the individual's family because
wealthy people are able to purchase any needed services that are not provided by
the state. For example, parents needing in-home assistance with their children
might choose to hire such help if they are financially able.
54. The term "suitable" was chosen instead of the more common term "fit" be-
cause a lack of ability to provide appropriate care ('unsuitable") does not automati-
cally point to a lack of love and devotion (which may be implied by the term
"unfit").
55. Thus, for a parent who is "always suitable" but has a disability, any percep-
tion of parental unfitness must be attributed to prejudice, stereotyping, or an in-
ability to accept different parenting approaches. The term "always" in this context
is meant to suggest that these parents presently require no assistance to provide
for the needs of any children.
56. Deciding how many and what kind of services would be required before a




controverted that most blind parents, many parents with mental
illness, and some parents with retardation are, in fact, "always
suitable,"57 and raise wonderful families despite the dual burdens
of disability and discrimination. The key is to categorize each in-
dividual family based on the relevant circumstances and to ignore
outmoded biases based on prejudice and misconceptions. The
categorization will generally be most helpful when determined in
reference to a specific child. A parent who is completely paralyzed
may be "always suitable" for a sixteen-year-old, but "suitable with
help" for an infant, or "never suitable" for a child with extensive
special needs.
This framework may be useful because it focuses attention on
the objective components of a parent's abilities. 58 In particular,
trying to decide what services, if any, a presumed "suitable with
help" parent requires might lead an evaluator to realize that spe-
cific services are not needed and that the parent in question is ac-
tually "always suitable."59  Moreover, the framework allows for
segregation of different aspects of a parent's abilities. Parents
with disabilities, like all parents, can have negative parenting at-
tributes in combination with their disability, such as a mother
with cancer who is also physically abusive to her child. When this
parent's abilities are evaluated, she might be found to be "suitable
with help" with respect to her disability, but "never suitable" with
57. That is, there have been at least some parents with these and other dis-
abilities who have successfully raised their children. The term "always suitable"
does not mean that all parents with similar disabilities are suitable, or that the
specific parents at issue might not become unsuitable given a change in circum-
stances. The term "always suitable" instead means that the specific parents at
issue are presently capable of raising their children without assistance, and the
term is used to equate parents with disability with their nondisabled counterparts
(to whom the label "always suitable" would apply with respect to lack of disability).
58. Unfortunately, prejudice will likely remain a part of the categorization
process despite any analytical devices.
59. Consider as an example the prospect of evaluating a blind couple with a
toddler. Initially, many people might hesitate to call such a couple "always suit-
able" even with evidence that they have successfully raised the child thus far.
"Never suitable," implying that the couple is completely incapable of raising their
child despite the provision of extensive support services, also seems an inappropri-
ate choice, because some (actually, nearly all) blind people are fully capable of
raising a child without extensive outside assistance. However, if the couple is
"suitable with help," what services are necessary to keep them "suitable"? Cer-
tainly 24-hour attendant care is unnecessary; daily visits by a social services
worker are unlikely to do more than provide momentary peace of mind; and, in
fact, in most cases, such a couple needs no special services. The reality is that
many blind parents have children, sighted and unsighted, and previously sighted
parents become blind due to disease or accident, and most are capable of being
successful parents without special support services.
[Vol. 16:153
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respect to the abuse.60 The framework works best when applied
together with consideration of support services because proper use
of the "suitable with help" category requires information about
those services that might offer assistance; the greater the number
and diversity of services considered, the more parents can be cate-
gorized as "suitable with help" instead of "never suitable." The in-
terplay between available services and parent categorization is
necessarily fact-specific and should be considered on a case-by-case
basis. Analytically, the categorization should not be limited by the
poor availability of support services in a specific community;
rather, appropriate categorization should spur improved design of
support programs.
The goal of every parental-fitness determination should be
never to leave children in the care of a "never suitable" parent,
never to interfere with the family of an "always suitable" parent,
and always to identify the "suitable with help" parent, identifying
also which services will keep that parent "suitable."
II. The Americans with Disabilities Act
Prior to the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) in 1990, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehab Act) was the
only major piece of civil rights legislation generally protecting per-
sons with disability.61 Although an important piece of civil rights
legislation, the Rehab Act only applies to employers and other re-
cipients of federal funding62 and is therefore severely limited in
scope. 63 However, several of the key concepts of the ADA are de-
rived from the Rehab Act and judicial interpretations of it. In par-
ticular, the Rehab Act gave rise to the ADA's "reasonable accom-
modation" and "undue burden" concepts, and the Supreme Court
60. The ability to isolate the disability-related aspects of a parent's fitness may
become very important in establishing an ADA claim. It is, of course, possible that
there would be overlap between characteristics related to disability and charac-
teristics unrelated to disability. In the example of a mother with cancer who
abuses her child, the abuse may be related to a mental condition caused by the
cancer or its treatment, or it might predate the cancer. Courts (or other evaluat-
ors) would need to answer these difficult factual questions when using this ana-
lytical framework.
61. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794 (1994).
62. See id. § 794.
63. The Rehab Act also suffers from "weaknesses ... [that] arise from its
statutory language, the limited extent of its coverage, inadequate enforcement
mechanisms and erratic judicial interpretations." Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d
325, 331 (3rd Cir. 1995) (footnote omitted) (quoting Robert Burgdorf, The Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil
Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 431 (1991)).
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case School Board v. Arline,6 4 in interpreting and applying the Re-
hab Act, defined the parameters of the ADA's "direct threat" de-
fense.65 The ADA specifically adopted certain provisions of the
Rehab Act,66 and incorporated by reference or language other Re-
hab Act concepts.6 7 The Rehab Act remains in force and is avail-
able in any claim against a recipient of federal funds, but in gen-
eral, the ADA is a more effective tool in the parenting context
given its broader scope and more flexible enforcement provisions.
A. Structure
The ADA is comprised of five titles, devoted to employment
(Title I), public services (Title II), public accommodations (Title
III), telecommunications (Title IV), and miscellaneous provisions
(Title V).68 Congressional findings, codified in the Act, describe the
extent of discrimination suffered by persons with disability. 69 The
scope of the ADA clearly is meant to be broad: "It is the purpose of
this Act ... to invoke the sweep of congressional authority ... in
order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day
by people with disabilities."70
Critical to the ADA is the definition of disability. Congress
chose to be inclusive in its definition, extending the ADA to all
persons with impairments that substantially limit major life ac-
tivities, providing protection to all persons with disability.71 The
Act makes no distinctions between physical and mental impair-
ments; thus, the same standards apply to both. Deciding to whom
64. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
65. For a discussion of these terms, see infra Part II.B.
66. For example, under certain circumstances, the ADA explicitly adopts
remedies available under the Rehab Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994)
(enforcement of ADA against public entities).
67. See, e.g., id. § 12102 (auxiliary aids and services); id. § 12134 (ADA regula-
tions must be consistent with Rehab Act).
68. See id. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
69. See id. § 12101(a) (1)-(9). Some of the more notable findings include that
43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities; that dis-
crimination persists and continues to be a pervasive social problem; and that the
Nation's goals are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent
living and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disability. See id.
70. Id. § 12101(b)(4).
71. "The term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual-
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment."
Id. § 12102(2). Moreover, the ADA also prohibits so-called "associational discrimi-
nation" based on relationship or association with an individual with disability. See
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(E) (1994) (Title III); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(g) (1995) (Title II).
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the ADA applies is an inquiry critical to any ADA analysis, and
has been discussed elsewhere. 72 For the present discussion, how-
ever, this threshold question will be considered to have been an-
swered in favor of the parent with the alleged disability. That is,
this Article will assume that any potential plaintiffs have met
their prima facie burden of showing they have a disability and,
therefore, are entitled to ADA protection.
The ADA sections that are the most relevant in the present
context are Titles II and III. Title II, "Public Entity," applies to
any state or local government, and any department, agency, or
other instrumentality of such a government.7 3 The operative lan-
guage of Title II prohibits, for a "qualified individual with a dis-
ability,"' 74 the exclusion from participation in or the denial of the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity.
Regulations implementing Title II are promulgated by the De-
partment of Justice.7 5 The remedies for a violation of Title II are
the same as those under the Rehab Act;76 these include adminis-
trative complaints, litigation leading to equitable relief7 7 and at-
torney's fees.78 Moreover, money damages may be available under
a recent Supreme Court decision 79 permitting such damages under
a similar law (Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972).80 In
the parenting context, money damages are of little use; parents
with disabilities want their children, not money, although the
ability to recover at least attorney's fees enables greater access to
justice in the face of discriminatory treatment by a public entity.
Title III, "Public Accommodations," applies generally to any
private entities engaged in interstate commerce. 8 ' Like Title II, it
72. For a concise yet excellent introduction to the definition of "disability" un-
der the ADA, see Chai R. Feldblum, Antidiscrimination Requirements of the ADA,
inl IMPLEMENTING THE ADA, supra note 3, at 35, 38-42.
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).
74. "The term 'qualified individual with a disability' means an individual with
a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
practices ... meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services
or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." Id. §
12131(2).
75. See id. § 12134.
76. See id. § 12133.
77. For example, one type of relevant equitable relief would be an order com-
pelling the public entity to end the discriminatory practice.
78. See Linda Kilb, Title Il-Public Services, Subtitle A- State and Local Gov-
ernment's Role, in IMPLEMENTING THE ADA, supra note 3, at 87, 108.
79. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
80. See Kilb, supra note 78, at 108.
81. The ADA specifies several dozen entities that are public accommodations,
but the list, while long, is not meant to be complete. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181.
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prohibits discrimination in broad terms: "[n]o individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation... 82
The definition of discrimination includes "denial of participation,"83
"participation in unequal benefit,"84 "separate benefit,"85 the use of
eligibility criteria that have the effect of discriminating,86 and the
failure to make reasonable modifications in policies 87 or to provide
auxiliary aids88 to prevent any of the above. The Department of
Justice also promulgates the regulations implementing Title 111.89
Remedies for violations of Title III include administrative claims,
injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and under certain circumstances,
monetary damages. 90 As noted above, however, injunctive relief,
rather than monetary damages, is likely to be the remedy of great-
est interest in the parenting context.
B. Defenses9l
The ADA provides for several statutory and regulatory de-
fenses. Both Title II and Title III permit an exception to the "no
discrimination" requirements if doing so would "fundamentally al-
ter" the nature of the program or service at issue.92 For Title III,
the ADA explicitly includes an "undue burden" defense,9 3 which
tends to limit the costs that may be required of an entity to ac-
commodate people with disabilities, but there may be a question as
to whether the "undue burden" defense is available to a Title II de-
fendant.94 The ADA's implementing regulations specify several
factors to be weighed when considering an undue burden claim:
"(1) the nature and cost of the action .. .(2) the overall financial
82. Id. § 12181(a).
83. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i).
84. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii).
85. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii).
86. See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i).
87. See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
88. See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
89. See id. § 12186(b).
90. See id. § 12188.
91. For detailed discussion of the application of ADA defenses, see infra Parts
III.B.2, IV.B.1-3. Although not discussed in this text, all of the defenses consid-
ered are also available under Title I.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Title III); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1996)
(Title II).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(iii).
94. See infra note 315 (discussing acceptance by some courts of the "undue
burden" defense in Title II claims).
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resources of the site or sites involved . . . the effect on expenses
and resources . . .[and] (4) if applicable, the overall financial re-
sources of any parent corporation or entity ...."95 Although the
standards for applying this test will be developed more fully in the
context of specific ADA claims, it is worth noting that the term
"undue" in the defense should be read as implying a balancing of
the interests at stake. That is, a relatively low "cost"96 might be an
"undue burden" when the deprivation caused by the discrimination
at issue is slight, such as might be the case if a person confined to
a wheelchair sought an extremely expensive modification to avoid
a two block detour to an accessible facility entrance. However,
considerably higher costs should be borne, without becoming
"undue," when the deprivation is significant. Given the high pro-
tections afforded parents by the Constitution, courts should coun-
tenance "undue burden" claims that would tend to interfere with
parents' rights only under the most extreme circumstances. 97
In School Board v. Arline,98 the Supreme Court interpreted
the Rehab Act in a case involving a school teacher infected with
tuberculosis.99 The teacher was dismissed from her position after
the third recurrence of the disease. After concluding that tuber-
culosis did constitute a handicap under the statute, the Court con-
sidered whether the Rehab Act's "otherwise qualified" requirement
barred recovery because the plaintiff was potentially infectious
and therefore might constitute a threat to her students. 10 0 In its
analysis, the Court articulated the standards that were later in-
corporated into the regulations implementing a "direct threat" de-
fense for Title III of the ADA.1°1 This defense, adopting the Rehab
Act standards of the Arline decision, shields an entity from liabil-
ity when the service or accommodation at issue poses a "significant
risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by
modification of policies."'1 2 The determination of a "direct threat"
must include "an individual assessment, based on reasonable
95. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
96. The burden need not be financial.
97. On the other hand, the state's interests in protecting children would not be
appropriately considered under the "undue burden" standard, even though the
state might argue it bears a social burden when children are harmed. Because the
"burden" is borne by an identified person or persons, rather than by the state as a
whole, and because the burden takes the form of the risk of harm, it is better con-
sidered in the "direct threat" context.
98. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
99. See id. at 273.
100. See id. at 287.
101. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.208 (1996).
102. Id. § 36.208(b) (emphasis added).
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judgment that relies on current medical knowledge or on the best
available objective evidence, to ascertain: the nature, duration,
and severity of the risk; [and] the probability that the potential
injury will actually occur."'10 3 The determination may not be based
on generalizations or stereotypes.10 4
Although Title II does not explicitly include the "direct
threat" defense, it may be read into its mandate that the person
with disability meet the "essential eligibility requirements for the
receipt of [the] services [at issue]' 10 5 which may be compared with
the Rehab Act's "otherwise qualified" requirement.
C. Conclusion
The ADA represents a substantial movement toward the
elimination of discrimination on the basis of disability. While its
strictly legal protections should not be underestimated, of equal or
greater importance is its potential for promoting public acceptance
of the diversity brought to society by people with disabilities. In
the short term, the legal empowerment offered by the ADA in the
way of litigation opportunities (and the threat of litigation) offers
great hope to people with disabilities. In the long term, however,
the greatest benefit provided by the ADA may be its ability to
eliminate the need to resort to legal means; its full promise may be
realized when those who would discriminate on the basis of dis-
ability learn that there is no reason to do so.
III. Parents with Disabilities Forming Families
For the majority of heterosexual couples in which one or both
partners has a disability, conceiving a child and starting a family
presents no greater difficulty than for the nondisabled population.
However, approximately one in six American couples will experi-
ence infertility10 6 at some point, 10 7 and nearly fourteen percent of
103. Id. § 36.208(c).
104. See id.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994). It is reasonable to conclude that an "essential"
eligibility requirement could include a standard for the safety of third persons.
This was the approach the Court used in Arline. See 480 U.S. at 287. For the
purposes of this Article, it will generally be assumed that the "direct threat" de-
fense is available in a Title II claim.
106. Infertility is defined as "the inability of a couple to conceive after twelve
months of intercourse without contraception." OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT,
100th CONG., INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 3 (May 1988)
[hereinafter OTA INFERTILITY REPORT].
107. See Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Making Babies, TIME, Sept. 30, 1991, at 56
(discussing advances in infertility treatments).
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married couples who are not surgically sterile are infertile during
any given year. 108 Because disability has only a neutral or nega-
tive impact on fertility, 109 people with disability who wish to have
children are equally or more likely than the nondisabled popula-
tion to experience infertility. Thus, it would be expected that at
least fourteen percent of heterosexual couples trying to conceive,
in which at least one partner has a disability, are infertile during
any given year, and at least one sixth of such couples will experi-
ence infertility sometime during their relationship.
Most couples troubled by infertility respond by seeking a
medical evaluation. 1 0 Depending upon the cause of the difficulty
in conceiving, the couple may choose to pursue more extensive
medical interventions in the form of assisted reproductive tech-
nologies (ARTs), they may choose to pursue an adoption, or they
may delay or cancel their plans to have a child. For people with
disabilities, the decision to pursue one of these family-building al-
ternatives may be more likely, even in the absence of infertility, if
the disability is genetic or presents a risk to a child."'
A. Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTs)
ARTs represent a broad spectrum of medical technologies de-
signed to treat infertility or otherwise aid conception. The most
basic ARTs include diet alterations, lifestyle changes, and drug or
hormone therapy. 112 More sophisticated interventions may include
artificial insemination by husband (AIH) or anonymous donor
(AID), or any of a family of complex surgical procedures commonly
referred to as in vitro fertilization (IVF). 113 All but the most basic
108. See OTA INFERTILITY REPORT, supra note 106, at 3.
109. That is, a disability does not enhance fertility, but many disabilities may
impair fertility. See, e.g., id. at 193 (stating that spinal cord injury is associated
with poor fertility prognosis in men).
110. OTA INFERTILITY REPORT, supra note 106, at 3.
111. Thus, an HIV-infected man and his wife might choose to investigate artifi-
cial insemination by donor (AID) or adoption, assuming such choices were avail-
able to them, even if neither was infertile.
112. See OTA INFERTILITY REPORT, supra note 106, at 117-21.
113. IVF as used in this Article refers to all of the surgical infertility treat-
ments, even though many of these procedures involve neither "in vitro" techniques
nor "fertilization." Among these procedures are "classic" IVF, in which a woman's
egg is harvested and fertilized outside the body, and then implanted in the donor's
or another recipient's uterus; GIFT (gamete intra-fallopian transfer), in which eggs
and sperm are combined in the fallopian tube; ZIFT (zygote intra-fallopian trans-
fer), in which an egg is fertilized as in classic IVF and then placed in the fallopian
tube; and ICCI (intra-cellular cytoplasmic injection), in which a sperm cell is in-
jected directly into an egg, with the resulting zygote then implanted into the
uterus or placed in the fallopian tube. For a more thorough discussion of infertil-
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of these interventions require the services of a medical profes-
sional, most often a reproductive endocrinologist1 4 or a urolo-
gist. 115
1. Likelihood of Discrimination
ARTs have been the subject of heated popular debate, but the
focus of most of the public attention has been the status of the
children resulting from these techniques,1 1 6 or the high costs of the
treatments. Little attention has been paid to the process by which
patients are accepted for treatment, although the medical commu-
nity has been somewhat concerned with the implications of post-
menopausal motherhood 17 and some writers have been concerned
with the implication of ARTs for homosexual sperm donors.118 The
American Fertility Society, in its official guidelines for ARTs,
states simply that the "inability to rear children" may be an ethical
reason for denying access to ARTs.119
A comprehensive Congressional Office of Technology Assess-
ment (OTA) report issued in 1988 failed to address access from
anything but a financial perspective. 120 Interestingly, a separate
ity treatments, see id. at 117-35.
114. Reproductive endocrinology is a subspecialty of the medical field obstetrics
and gynecology.
115. OTA INFERTILITY REPORT, supra note 106, at 3-5.
116. See, e.g., Michael S. Simon, "Honey, I Froze the Kids" Davis v. Davis and
the Legal Status of Early Embryos, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 131 (1991); John Dwight
Ingram, In Vitro Fertilization: Problems and Solution, 98 DICK. L. REV. 67 (1993).
More specifically, much of the public focus has been on whether the union of an
egg and sperm is a "child."
117. See, e.g., Eike-Henner Kluge, Reproductive Technology and Postnieno-
pausal Motherhood, 151 CAN. MED. ASSOc. J. 353 (1994) (recommending the exclu-
sion of postmenopausal women); Donald Rieger, Gamete Donation: An Opinion on
the Recommendations of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies,
151 CAN. MED. ASSOC. J. 1433 (1994) (also recommending the exclusion of post-
menopausal women). In fact, the British seem to be far ahead of Americans in
considering these kinds of issues, perhaps in part due to the public financing of
most or all medical interventions. For an excellent discussion of the British view
of ARTs access issues, see Ken Daniels & Karyn Taylor, Formulating Selection
Policies for Assisted Reproduction, 37 SOC. SCI. MED. 1473 (1993). There has been
no comparable discussion by Americans. The British discussion does not address
discrimination in the access to ARTs. See id.
118. See, e.g., Fred A. Bernstein, This Child Does Have Two Mothers... And a
Sperm Donor with Visitation, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (1996)
(discussing the legal status of a homosexual sperm donor who is involved in his
child's life).
119. See Ethics Comm., Am. Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Considerations of Assisted
Reproductive Technologies, 62 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 18s, 19s (Supp. 1 Nov.
1994). These guidelines are designed to provide a framework for consideration,
not to create requirements for ARTs providers. See id.
120. See OTA INFERTILITY REPORT, supra note 106, at 20.
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report on artificial insemination issued by the same body only
three months later revealed considerable potential for discrimina-
tion during the patient acceptance process. 12 1 OTA surveyed 1,213
fertility society physicians 122 during the summer of 1987.123 These
doctors reported that one in five patients seeking artificial insemi-
nation is rejected. 124 The most common rejection criteria were non-
medical: patient unmarried (52% of rejections), "psychologically inma-
ture" (22%), homosexual (15%), or welfare dependent (15%).125
When asked "[h]ave you ever rejected or would you be likely
to reject a request for artificial insemination from a potential re-
cipient because she was/has: ", the results indicated a sur-
prising willingness on the part of the physicians to make social
judgments. 126 Sixty-one percent had rejected, or would be likely to
reject, an unmarried woman without a partner; 127 85% would re-
ject a psychologically immature woman; 79% would reject a
woman with a history of a serious genetic disorder; 128 95% would
reject a woman with HIV infection; 32% would reject a woman
with less than average intelligence; and 9% of infertility-specialist
physicians reported that they would reject a woman because she
had less than a high school degree. 129
The OTA also reported that about half the cohort (52%) per-
formed a "personality assessment" on their potential recipients,
44% screened for genetic diseases, and 74% screened for "selected
diseases."130 In at least some cases, the purpose of these screening
mechanisms was "to detect diagnosable mental illness or to ad-
dress more general considerations of fitness for pregnancy and
motherhood."'131 The physicians surveyed represent the same
group that would provide ARTs services other than artificial in-
121. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, 100th. CONG., ARTIFICIAL INSEMI-
NATION: PRACTICE IN THE U.S. 33 (Aug. 1988) [hereinafter OTA ARTIFICIAL
INSEMINATION REPORT].
122. Fertility society physicians were defined as members of either the Ameri-
can Fertility Society or the American Society of Andrology. See id. at 3.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 27.
125. Id. Responses total more than 100% because multiple rejection criteria
were permitted in the survey. See id.
126. See id. at 29.
127. Only 49% would reject an unmarried woman with a male partner. See id.
128. The question did not distinguish between genetic disorders that were cer-
tain, likely, or very unlikely to be inherited by the children of an individual or cou-
ple. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 25.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
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semination;132 thus, the results are generally applicable to the ex-
periences of anyone seeking access to ARTs even though the sur-
vey focused on artificial insemination practices.
There have been no reported decisions of any kind of dis-
crimination case brought against a provider of ARTs services, nor
have there been any newspaper accounts of such discrimination.
However, the OTA survey results indicate not only the high likeli-
hood of future discrimination, but that actual treatment decisions
have been based on social factors that may well have been dis-
criminatory. Given the discrimination that persons with disabili-
ties have endured in the past, it seems assured that they will en-
counter discrimination in at least some of their experiences when
seeking access to ARTs. However, this Article analyzes only dis-
crimination that is based in whole or in part on the provider's con-
clusion that the prospective patient should not be a parent because
of a disability. 133 That is, a provider who refuses to treat a woman
with mental retardation because the provider is prejudiced against
people with developmental disabilities could proceed under an
"ordinary" ADA analysis, 134 but a provider who refuses to treat a
woman married to a man with multiple sclerosis because the pro-
vider does not think a "handicapped man" can be an effective fa-
ther will be considered in this discussion. 35 Furthermore, it is im-
portant to distinguish between discrimination against disability
and discrimination against other characteristics that may appear
in combination with disability. For example, a lesbian quadriple-
132. See OTA INFERTILITY REPORT, supra note 106, at 3-5.
133. Thus, the discussion will be limited to what might be termed "parental un-
suitability disability discrimination."
134. This is not to imply that this form of discrimination is less repugnant than
any other form, but the present discussion is limited to discrimination on the basis
of disability in the evaluation of parental fitness. ARTs providers often offer a
range of services broader than just reproductive technologies, including, for exam-
ple, routine gynecological services. If such a provider were to discriminate against
a potential patient with disability regardless of the type of service to be provided,
then the discrimination will be considered to be unrelated to an evaluation of pa-
rental fitness. Even if the particular provider offers only ARTs services, it is pos-
sible for him or her to discriminate on the basis of disability without that discrimi-
nation being related to parenting. People with disability encounter a great deal of
discrimination when trying to gain access to all kinds of medical services. See,
e.g., United States v. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. La. 1995) (involving a den-
tist who refused to treat HIV-positive patient despite lack of evidence of risk to
dentist or other patients); Simenson v. Hoffman, No. 95 C 1401, 1995 WL 631804
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 1995) (concerning a family practitioner who refused to treat child
with pneumonia because of unrelated non-contagious skin disorder; doctor yelled
repeatedly at parents, in front of the child, after seeing lesions).
135. The ADA's prohibitions include discrimination based on association with a
disabled person. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(E) (1994) (Title III); 28 C.F.R. §
35.130(g) (1996) (Title II).
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gic may be refused AID because her physician feels that quadri-
plegics should not be parents, but the same patient could be denied
AID because the physician is opposed to lesbian parenting. 136 Peo-
ple with disability display the entirety of human behavior, and the
same alternative, unusual, and offensive manifestations of charac-
ter found in the nondisabled are found among those with disabil-
ity. 137
2. Anatomy of an ADA Claim
Most facilities offering ARTs services are either hospitals or
free-standing medical offices. 138 If the facility in question is a
public entity, such as a state-run hospital, then Title II of the ADA
applies; otherwise, Title III applies. 139 In either case, the presen-
tation of a discrimination claim would begin with the plaintiff es-
tablishing (1) membership in the protected class of persons with
disability,' 40 and (2) his or her exclusion from participation in the
services of the ARTs facility. 141 At least in the Title II context, es-
tablishing membership in the protected class may require the
plaintiff to demonstrate that he or she is "qualified" to receive
ARTs services. The commentary accompanying the implementing
regulations for Title II refers to the absence of valid defenses when
defining "qualified."'142 In other words, a "qualified individual" is
136. Again, this is not to suggest that either form of discrimination is tolerable
or legal; however, the present analysis is concerned only with the former. Homo-
sexuality is explicitly not a disability, see 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(5)(i) (1996); id. §
36.104(5)(i), so discrimination against a lesbian, without more, would not violate
the ADA.
137. Patients seeking access to ARTs may be more prone to disability discrimi-
nation that is unrelated to parenting ability than would parents in the other con-
texts discussed in this Article, because the provision of services at issue is further
removed from the parenting context. In decisions regarding adoption or the ter-
mination of parental rights, the ability to parent is directly at issue whereas in
decisions regarding ARTs, conception is directly at issue. In other words, the
ARTs provider is primarily concerned with the manipulations necessary to achieve
pregnancy, not parenthood.
138. See OTA INFERTILITY REPORT, supra note 106, at 97 (explaining trends of
people seeking infertility services).
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (1)(B) (Title II); 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (7)(F) (Title III).
Because ARTs services are always provided at physical "facilities" (i.e. hospitals or
medical clinics), there is no need to consider whether Title III applies to
"programs" not offered at fixed "places." See infra note 213 and accompanying
text.
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(E); 28 C.F.R. 35.130(g) (1995); supra note 71
and accompanying text (quoting the statutory definition and explaining that asso-
ciational disability discrimination is also included in the definition according to the
regulation).
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (public entity); id. § 12182 (public accommodation).
142. See U.S. E.E.O.C. & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
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one who does not require a fundamental alteration to the program
at issue, who does not present a direct threat to another, and who
does not present an undue burden to the program. 143 In the ARTs
context, the "exclusion from participation" element will most likely
be the complete refusal by the defendant to provide ARTs services
to the patient with disability. It is possible, however, that the pro-
vider might agree to provide only some forms of treatment. For
example, a doctor might agree to write a prescription for ovulation
drugs but refuse to provide more intensive IVF services. To be
relevant to the present discussion, the refusal to provide IVF
services would have to be based upon the doctor's belief that the
patient's disability would prevent proper parenting. While it is
unlikely that such a belief would permit the doctor to offer the ini-
tial prescription but not the more intensive services, the possibility
should be considered.
In the context of parental disability discrimination, the
"undue burden" defense, 144 while available, is unlikely to help the
defendant because most ARTs programs would not be burdened if
compelled to consider all patients with disability as suitable par-
ents.145 The "fundamental alteration" defense is similarly ineffec-
tual.146 The "direct threat" defense, however, is both available147
and likely to be employed.
ACT HANDBOOK 11-27 (1992) [hereinafter ADA HANDBOOK] (explaining 28 C.F.R. §
35.104).
143. In short, the "qualified individual" language often seems to be used as a
shorthand method of referring to an individual not triggering a valid defense. The
"qualified individual" language was drawn from the Rehab Act's "otherwise quali-
fied" language. The Rehab Act, however, did not include the explicit defenses
found in the statute and regulations of the ADA. Thus, the courts fashioned these
defenses to the Rehab Act using the "otherwise qualified" language. Because the
defenses to the ADA are explicit, any additional limitations imposed by the
"qualified individual" language are minor.
144. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (explaining the undue bur-
den defense).
145. It is possible that the patient with a disability could present a burden, per-
haps even an "undue burden," to the ARTs facility, such as a case in which a pro-
spective patient requires extensive physical alterations to the ARTs facility to gain
access. However, this burden would be associated with the patient's status as a
person with a disability, and not with the patient's ability or inability to parent a
child.
146. An ARTs program could claim a "fundamental alteration" if the program
includes a philosophical component that would be opposed to child rearing by a
certain segment of society. For example, an ARTs program affiliated with a relig-
ious organization (ignoring the fact that many religions are opposed to ARTs serv-
ices) might refuse to treat an HIV-positive former prostitute on the basis of some
moral or philosophical objection. This is unlikely, however, to be based on a belief
that an HIV-positive former prostitute is an inappropriate parent, distinct from
the belief that an HIV-positive former prostitute should not get general medical
services. In short, this would be another example of discrimination based on dis-
[Vol. 16:153
PARENTS WITH DISABILITIES
a. The "Direct Threat"Defense
The "direct threat" defense offers limited or total immunity to
an appropriately situated ADA defendant. Both Title II and Title
III likely require the same standard for the defense, 148 that of a
"significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be
eliminated by a modification of policies."'149 The ARTs provider
may seek to employ this defense in two different ways.
First, the provider may argue that the provision of ARTs
services, followed by a successful conception and pregnancy, would
lead to the birth of a child with one or more parents unable to pro-
vide appropriate care. For example, the doctor who has been
asked to provide artificial insemination by husband (AIH) services
to a paraplegic couple may express doubt that the couple is capable
of safely raising a child. Second, the provider may argue that the
patient's disability would present a risk to the child during the
gestational period. Examples of this concern might include HIV-
infection (of the patient or the patient's partner) with risk of
transmission to the child, developmental disability interfering
with appropriate prenatal care, mental illness manifested as suici-
dal or violent tendencies, or any genetic disability that might in-
terfere with a healthy pregnancy or be transmitted to the child. In
either case, that of gestational concern or child-rearing concern,
the provider might argue that protection of the child who would
result from the successful provision of the ARTs services requires
the treatment refusal.
i. Gestational Concerns
"Gestational concerns" may present significant difficulties for
a plaintiff if the concerns are based upon a medical risk. The
"direct threat" defense requires an "individualized determina-
tion."150 The ARTs provider in most cases is a physician, usually a
reproductive endocrinologist with training and experience in ob-
stetrics, the branch of medicine specifically trained to manage
ability, but where the object of the discrimination is not parental unfitness. See
supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing people with disabilities' encoun-
ters with discrimination).
147. The "direct threat' defense is available to defendants in both Title II and
Title III actions. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text (outlining the
direct threat defense).
148. See supra notes 101- 105 and accompanying text.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1994); see supra notes 101-105 and accompanying
text.
150. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(c) (1996).
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pregnancy. 15 1 Thus, the provider is capable of rendering an indi-
vidualized expert medical opinion about the potential risks to the
child152 when those risks are of a medical nature. Once a physician
has rendered a judgment about a matter of medical expertise
within that physician's field of competence, a court is unlikely to
overrule that opinion if it is based upon scientific evidence. 53 In
Arline, the Court stated that an assessment of risk should include
facts "based on reasonable medical judgments.., about (a) the na-
ture of the risk... (c) the severity of the risk.., and (d) the prob-
abilities the [disability] ... will cause varying degrees of harm."' 54
Thus, a physician refusing to provide ARTs services would proba-
bly prevail under an ADA claim where the refusal was based upon
the medical risks to the child presented by the disability. 155 This
would be true even if the disability were discovered by a provider
who did not routinely screen patients; 56 the ADA requires an in-
dividualized determination that a direct threat exists, but not a
practice that guarantees the detection of all direct threats. 157 The
151. See supra note 114 (explaining reproductive endocrinology).
152. Some may argue that the appropriate term is "fetus" rather than "child."
There is a lack of consensus as to when a "fetus" becomes a "child," but this Article
does not attempt to address that issue. Rather, this article uses the term "child" to
focus on discrimination against parents, which is likely to be unrelated to the spe-
cific status of the child.
153. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987).
154. Id. (quoting Brief for American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae 19
and referring specifically to "direct threats" posed by infectious diseases). The
regulations and the ADA itself clearly indicate adoption of these standards for all
forms of disability, not just infectious diseases.
155. This would probably include genetic or infectious risks to the child. Of
course, the plaintiff could prevail by presenting evidence that the "direct threat"
standards have not been met. This is a difficult but not impossible burden when
the defendant is a physician who has conducted an individualized evaluation and
concluded that the risk is real. This issue becomes increasingly difficult to resolve
when the risks to the child are expressed as well-established probabilities (for ex-
ample, the risk of an HIV-positive woman passing the virus to her fetus is ap-
proximately 15-40%, see Edward M. Connor et al., Reduction of Maternal-Infant
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 with Zidovudien Treat-
mnent, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1173 (1994)) because there is probably no consensus
as to the level of acceptable risk. All pregnancies are at some quantifiable risk for
danger to the child. The question is how much risk should permit an ARTs pro-
vider to refuse treatment?
156. This should be contrasted with other types of ADA claims in which a
screening mechanism or lack thereof might be discriminatory by itself. The "direct
threat" defense permits exclusion whenever the threat exists, regardless of any
discriminatory practices that might be employed in detecting the threat. See Ar-
line, 480 U.S. at 288. However, a discriminatory screening mechanism might give
rise to a separate ADA claim (e.g., an ARTs provider administers IQ tests to pa-
tients in wheelchairs and refuses to treat patients with an IQ that is less than
100). See 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(I) (1994); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (b)(3) (1996).
157. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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fact that the provider in this scenario might prevail may anger pa-
tients who feel that the weighing of the risks to their child should
be left to them, but the ADA does not require service providers
(whether public entities or public accommodations) to ignore risks
to third parties, and it is common for medical professionals to ex-
ercise their own judgments when treatment implicates medical
risks to third parties. 158
However, as some of the above examples illustrate, many in-
stances of gestational concern could arise in which the risk to the
child is not within the scope of expertise of the ARTs provider. In
these instances, the provider should be required to seek an ap-
praisal from a qualified expert before being permitted to escape li-
ability for a discriminatory denial of access to ARTs services. Al-
though the ADA may not require a medical (or other expert)
opinion in all "direct threat" cases, 159 it does require an individu-
alized determination of the "nature, duration, and severity of the
risk" and the "probability that the potential injury will actually oc-
cur."160
Given the medical nature of any threats posed to the unborn
child of a pregnant woman, it is reasonable to conclude that most
evaluations of such threats will require an advanced degree of
knowledge. 61 If the ARTs provider does not have such knowledge,
he or she will need to seek out expert assistance to satisfy the
158. In fact, physicians have been held to have a duty to consider third party
risks in a variety of circumstances. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (involving a patient who revealed to his psychologist his
intention to commit murder); Wilschinsky v Medina, 775 P.2d 713 (N.M. 1989)
(concerning a patient who was in a car accident after receiving treatment in doc-
tor's office); Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1993) (involving a pa-
tient's spouse who contracted an infectious disease). Moreover, it is well settled
that obstetricians owe a duty to a developing fetus during the prenatal period. See
STEVEN E. PEGALIS & HARVEY E. WACHSMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 2d § 3.13 (1992). It has yet to be determined the scope of the duty, if
any, owed to the potential fetus in cases of ARTs.
159. The Arline opinion suggests that "courts normally should defer to the rea-
sonable medical judgments of public health officials," 480 U.S. at 288, although it
does not explicitly require expert testimony. Likewise, the regulations imple-
menting the ADA require a "reasonable judgment that relies on current medical
knowledge." 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(c). In practice, this becomes an evidentiary ques-
tion, and while it is possible that a defendant could present a valid "direct threat"
defense without medical testimony (perhaps with a very obvious threat, as with a
disease widely known to be very infectious), most successful "direct threat" de-
fenses probably will require expert testimony.
160. 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(c).
161. For example, it is less likely that most ARTs providers will have knowledge
in the area of developmental disability; therefore, they might be incompetent to
determine, without advice, whether an individual with mild retardation could
properly care for herself during pregnancy.
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"individualized determination" requirement and avoid liability for
a discriminatory action. To the extent that even expert knowledge
does not settle any questions that may arise (for example, when
both sides agree there is a significant risk that a child would suffer
an injury, but the parents wish to conceive anyway), the fact-
specific resolution would turn on the Arline factors.' 62 However,
the intent of the ADA clearly disallows stereotyping as a permissi-
ble factor for consideration. 163 For example, when the risk to the
child is that he or she may be at risk for disability, the ADA re-
quires reconsideration of outmoded perceptions that disability is a
horrible fate inflicted upon a "victim." If the potential harm is al-
ready borne by one or both parents (e.g., infertile deaf parents
with a significant risk of having a deaf child), the court would be
well-advised to place great weight on the wishes of the parents
having experience with the disability in question. Moreover, per-
mitting ARTs providers any significant degree of control in select-
ing the allowable (desirable?) characteristics in a child raises trou-
bling eugenics concerns and may call for the restriction of the
discretion of providers when considering genetic risks.
ii. Child-Rearing Concerns
ARTs treatment refusals based on concern for the future
ability of the patient to provide safe parenting may prove more
problematic for defendants. In addition to the prospective nature
of any such evaluation, 64 the evaluation of the abilities of parents
with disabilities to raise their children is not generally within the
scope of expertise of ARTs providers. Although the ADA does not
require expert opinions when assessing third-person threats, 165 the
area of parental fitness is sufficiently complex that most plaintiffs
will probably succeed in shifting to the defendant the burden to
show the risk of harm in all but the most extreme circum-
stances.166 The requirement of an individualized determination
162. See supra text accompanying note 154 (identifying the factors).
163. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994).
164. This discussion assumes that there are no data based on any past child-
rearing experiences of the particular patient. If such data are available, then the
analysis would be affected to the extent that such data may aid or hinder the de-
fendant's claims of parental unfitness. However, the requirement of an assess-
ment of an actual risk, and the other specific requirements of the ADA, should still
be satisfied, and any changes in circumstance from a previous child-rearing expe-
rience should be considered.
165. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
166. Thus, a mildly retarded patient seeking ARTs services may, simply by as-
serting her ability to parent effectively, compel the service provider to demonstrate
a "direct threat" as a basis for a treatment refusal. Such a demonstration would be
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may be enough, without more, to dissuade some ARTs providers
from refusing treatment.
Many child-rearing deficiencies related to parental disability
can be addressed by appropriate services. 167 An ARTs provider
who refuses to treat such a patient (that is, a "suitable with help"
parent), is, in essence, asking the patient to demonstrate that he
or she can procure any services needed to be suitable. 168 The
problem with this request is that it necessitates too much prognos-
tication on the part of both the provider and the patient. The abil-
ity to procure services is essentially financial, 169 and future finan-
cial status (or need) is often difficult to predict. Moreover, any
person can become partially or completely disabled at any time,
but ARTs providers do not require support-service contingency
plans of their nondisabled patients. ARTs providers have no spe-
cial expertise in evaluating future parenting abilities, or future fi-
nancial status, and in fact are less able than the patient to evalu-
ate the specific parenting needs and abilities presented by a
particular set of circumstances. Thus, the "direct threat" defense
should not prevail against a "suitable with help" parent.
The conclusion that the ADA may limit the ability of ARTs
providers to evaluate future parenting ability, and to decide how
and whether to act based on that evaluation, may be a source of
some concern to ARTs providers. The fact that the medical com-
munity apparently considers such evaluations both appropriate
and necessary170 evidences the extent to which such social judg-
ments have previously been exercised by ARTs providers. How-
ever well-meaning such judgments may have been, they have un-
doubtedly been at times discriminatory in practice. Couples
likely to require some expert intervention since an adequate individualized deter-
mination, as required under the ADA, see supra text accompanying note 160,
probably cannot be made by a reproductive endocrinologist with no experience in
evaluating parental fitness or the abilities of the developmentally disabled. How-
ever, most courts would probably not require such an evaluation in more extreme
instances, such as that of an individual with profound retardation, in which the
parental fitness question is more obvious.
167. Parents with deficiencies that can be addressed by support services are ap-
propriately categorized as "suitable with help." See supra note 56 and accompa-
nying text.
168. If the parent in question is not "suitable with help," then the ability to pro-
cure support services becomes irrelevant.
169. That is, the wealthy can almost always purchase any necessary parental
assistance services that are not available through family, friends or government
resources. See supra note 53.
170. See supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text (demonstrating the preva-




without infertility problems need satisfy no social criteria' 7' to im-
plement a decision to have children. 172 To use infertility treatment
as a proxy for a parental fitness evaluation is both inappropriate
and ineffective. Should society decide that some more thorough
evaluation of parental fitness needs to attend the decision to bear
a child, it should be directed at all parents, not just those who are
infertile,173 and it should be conducted by professionals trained to
make such evaluations based upon objective evidence of future
parenting ability, not bias or prejudice. 174
171. Of course, any person desiring to conceive a child must have the ability to
attract a partner or to gain access to ARTs. For some individuals with disability,
these criteria alone may be insurmountable obstacles.
172. But see Roger W. McIntire, Parenthood Training or Mandatory Birth Con-
trol: Take Your Choice, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Oct. 1973), at 33, 39 (arguing that
society should prospectively restrict the right to parent by requiring training prior
to parenthood).
173. Thus, if parental fitness evaluations are deemed necessary, they should be
performed at the time of delivery, or during gestation, and not when an individual
seeks treatment for infertility. That this would be both impractical and, arguably,
immoral, does not detract from the likelihood that it would promote greater fair-
ness in that it would not segregate classes of prospective parents based upon their
biological fertility for an evaluation that is unrelated to the ability to conceive.
174. This could be very similar to the kind of prospective evaluation performed
prior to most adoptions. See infra notes 220-28 and accompanying text. This is
not meant, however, to advocate evaluations of all, or most, prospective parents.
On the contrary, this author feels that such evaluations would be ineffective at
screening bad parents from good parents. In the adoption context, prospective
evaluations serve a significant educational purpose, preparing adoptive parents for
the different challenges of raising adoptive children. See infra note 290. In addi-
tion, ARTs treatments are simply not analogous to adoptions. The primary argu-
ments for requiring prospective evaluations of adoptive parents, but not of all par-
ents, are the differences between raising adoptive children and biological children,
and the fact that the state or agency performing the evaluation is acting as the
parent until the adoption is completed. There are no data to suggest that raising a
child conceived through the use of ARTs is significantly different than raising a
child conceived without ARTs (although many ARTs are so new that it may be too
soon to determine whether those children who become aware of their status may
have some difficulties adjusting). More importantly, there is no need for the state
or the ARTs provider to stand in the place of the parent for the purposes of con-
ducting a "pre-placement" evaluation. Adoptions involve real children, who, ana-
lytically, always have a parent, whether the "parent' is the state or one or more
individuals. These "parents" have a responsibility to evaluate, formally or infor-
mally, those to whom they entrust their children. In the case of children conceived
with ARTs, there is no child needing the exercise of parental evaluation prior to a
placement. In other words, adoption pre-placement evaluations are performed by
the child's present "parents" -to assure the suitability of future parents. In the
ARTs context, as in unaided conception, there are no present "parents" demanding




A treatment refusal by an ARTs provider could involve any of
the three analytical categories of parents with disabilities pre-
sented above. 175 However, because the evaluation of the "ability to
parent" is not within the scope of knowledge of the lay public, or,
in most cases, the providers of ARTs services, it is not possible to
discern the troublesome "never suitable" category, in the context of
child-rearing, without resort to outside expertise. On the other
hand, ARTs providers would in many cases be qualified to identify
the "never suitable" category in the context of gestational concerns
based upon medical dangers. Similarly, in cases of the "suitable
with help" category of parents with disabilities, child-rearing con-
cerns should not be permitted to provide the basis for a treatment
refusal, although gestational concerns for this group of parents
might be a more suitable basis for refusal when based upon a
medical danger. 176 Under no circumstances should a treatment re-
fusal for a parent in the "always suitable" category be upheld.
The ADA reserves for the patient with disability the right to
participate in treatment decisions to the same extent as the non-
disabled patient.177 Because ARTs services are essentially medical
treatments, 178 the decision of whether and how to provide such
treatment cannot be made solely by the provider unless based
upon relevant medical judgments. Non-medical judgments ren-
dered by ARTs providers, when not essential to the medical treat-
ment, should be subjected to close scrutiny, particularly when they
have an impact on rights as fundamental as those exercised by
parents and parents-to-be. The ADA provides to patients who
have been refused ARTs treatment because of their disability the
power to compel an individualized determination of the actual risk
posed by their disability, and the possibility of procuring access to
previously denied services through legal means. 179 Although ARTs
175. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (explaining the three catego-
ries of parents).
176. For example, a woman with mild retardation and diabetes who is unable to
control her blood sugar level could conceivably be denied access to ARTs in the ab-
sence of support services that would permit her to manage her condition. The
same woman should not be denied access if she either has no medical condition
needing management, or if she can demonstrate the availability of appropriate
services.
177. However, an ARTs provider should not be compelled to follow the wishes of
an incompetent patient regardless of disability status.
178. ARTs services fit within the definition of "health care" and generally only
physicians may offer ARTs services. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 14-
101 (1995).
179. In many instances, merely the threat of legal action may be enough for the
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providers may bear additional costs (financial or otherwise) as a
result, the costs are inherent in the provider's choice to interfere
with the decision 180 to bear children that nature and society have
generally left to the mother and her partner. The mere fact that
the couple cannot effectuate their decision without medical assis-
tance should not be the trigger for a heightened review of their
parenting abilities.
B. Adoption
Adoption is the process through which the law substitutes for
the legal rights and duties existing between a child and his or her
biological parents' 81 similar rights and duties between the child
and his or her adoptive parents. 8 2 Once an adoption has been fi-
nalized, no legal bond exists between the child and the biological
parents, and the adoptive parents become the only legally recog-
nized parents of the child. Approximately three-fifths of all adop-
tions involve adoption by a step-parent or a relative.' 8 3 Thus, in
only about forty percent of all adoptions are the parties unrelated.
The adoption process is complex, and because it frequently
involves personal judgments by parents, social workers, judges,
and other adoption professionals, it is fraught with the opportunity
for discrimination. The large number of different methods by
which an adoption may be completed precludes a thorough discus-
sion of all of them. This Article will address some of the steps that
are common to many adoption scenarios and the mechanisms by
which the ADA offers potential protection for prospective adoptive
parents.
1. The Adoption Process
Adoption is a creature of state law. Each of the fifty states,
and each of the territories, governs adoptions differently. More-
over, in every jurisdiction there are many ways by which parents
may complete an adoption. 8 4 Within a single jurisdiction there
ARTs provider to "rethink" the decision to refuse treatment. When more than a
mere threat is required, a skilled advocate may be able to craft an amicable resolu-
tion without resorting to litigation, although court adjudication remains available
to the discrimination victim.
180. The decision remains with the patient; the ARTs provider should be viewed
as only participating in the means by which that decision is effectuated.
181. Given the complexities of ARTs and surrogacy arrangements available to-
day, there may be less than or more than two biological parents.
182. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 49 (6th ed. 1990).
183. See Spencer Rich, Demand for Adoptions Outnumbers the Babies, WASH.
POST, Nov. 20, 1985, at A19.
184. See JOAN HEIFETz HOLLINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.01
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may be different adoption scenarios depending upon the relation-
ship between the adoptive parents and the adoptee.' 85 Interstate
adoptions are, to an extent, governed by the Interstate Compact on
the Placement of Children (ICPC).186 International adoptions are
governed, among signatories, by the Hague Convention on Protec-
tion of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Inter-country Adop-
tion.187 In 1994, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) approved a rewrite of the Uniform
Adoption Act (IJAA),188 model legislation designed to provide
greater consistency in state approaches to adoption law, and rec-
ommended its enactment in all of the states. Although no state
has yet enacted the UAA in toto or in significant part, it has been
introduced in several state legislatures and represents a broad
composite of major aspects of the adoption process.
Adoptions may be categorized generally as either "agency" or
"independent." Agency adoptions involve, as is implied, an adop-
tion supervised by an adoption agency, and may be either public
(state-run agency) or private (independent agency, such as a re-
ligiously affiliated agency). Furthermore, agency adoptions may
be identified (the adoptive parents have identified the adoptee) or
non-identified (at the time of initial contact, the adoptive parents
have not identified the prospective adoptee). Independent adop-
tions may involve an identified placement 189 or some other facili-
tated match in which the birth parents and adoptive parents find
each other, or a third party, 190 often a lawyer, may locate an
adoptable child meeting certain characteristics sought by the
adoptive parents. Most states have different laws regarding
(1988 & Supp. 1997).
185. Some examples of the different relationships that might exist between the
parties would include step-parent and step-child adoptions, uncle-nephew adop-
tions, interstate adoptions involving strangers, adoption by foster parents, and in-
ternational adoptions involving strangers or relatives.
186. The ICPC has been enacted in every state. For citations to specific stat-
utes, see 2 ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE, AND
ADOPTION CASES 95, n. 192 (1993). Among other requirements, the ICPC mandates
pre-placement studies for all interstate non-relative adoptions. See id. at 96. For
the full text of the ICPC, see id. at 110-13. Other acts and statutes which may ap-
ply to adoptions include the UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 1-28, 9
U.L.A 123 (1968); the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28
U.S.C. § 738A, and the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1903,
1911-1923, 1931-1934, 1951, 1952, 1963 (1994).
187. The Hague Conference on Private International Law, Final Act of the Sev-
enteenth Session, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134.
188. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT §§ 1-8, 9 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1997).
189. This might occur when a pregnant woman decides to place the child with
friends of her family.
190. See HOLLINGER, supra note 184, § 1.05[3][b].
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agency and independent adoptions, and while the UAA maintains
some distinctions between the two, the standards are similar. 191
Most jurisdictions have expedited processes for the adoption of a
step-child or relative. 192
a. Agency Adoptions
Most agency adoptions include a pre-placement evaluation of
the adoptive home known as a "homestudy."' 93 This may be per-
formed by the agency that will be making the actual placement de-
cision, a separate agency, or an independent "evaluator."'194 Often,
the homestudy includes a frank discussion with the adoptive par-
ents about realistic expectations for the adoption process. If the
evaluator 195 is from the same agency that will be making the
placement decision, then the homestudy may also identify charac-
teristics suitable in an adoptive child.
The agency making the placement decision, generally after
the receipt of an approved homestudy, attempts to locate and
match a child with characteristics suitable for the adoptive par-
ents. Once a suitable child is located, information about him or
her is forwarded to the adoptive parents. If the parents are com-
fortable with the match, they indicate their acceptance and the
process of "assignment" is completed. 96 In all states, the adoption
of a child without the consent of either of the birth parents may be
accomplished only when a state-approved agency has studied and
consented to the placement. 197
Following the child's birth, 98 and any necessary approvals
(which may be especially important when the adoptee is an
191. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT §§ 2-102, 2-103, 9. U.L.A. at 12-14; id. § 1.0513].
192. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-104; 9 U.L.A. at 14-15; UNIF. ADOPTION ACT
§§ 4-101-4-113, 9 U.L.A. at 67-74; HOLLINGER, supra note 184, § 1.05[2][a].
193. See HOLLINGER, supra note 184, § 4.12 (1995). Pre-placement evaluations
are required under the UAA. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-201, 9 U.L.A. at 19-20.
194. "Evaluator" is the term used by the UAA but generally refers to a social
worker licensed in the state in which the adoption will occur. A few states (e.g.,
California) have special standards for "adoption specialists." See UNIF. ADOPTION
ACT § 2-202 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 21.
195. The term "evaluator" will be used to refer both to the individual conducting
the actual homestudy and the agency for which that individual works, if any.
Thus, an evaluator's standards may actually be those decided upon by the agency,
and not the individual whims of a particular social worker.
196. Most often, assignment is accompanied by a payment to the placing agency.
The financial aspects of adoption are complex and beyond the scope of this Article.
197. See HOLLINGER, supra note 184, § 2.01[1]. Some states license private en-
tities to perform pre-placement studies. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-
312 (1996).
198. It is not uncommon for the assignment to precede the birth of the adoptee,
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"international orphan"199), the child is placed in the adoptive home.
Often, there will be a post-placement home visit to ensure the
suitability of the adoptive placement and a waiting period.
200
Lastly, there will be a judicial finalization, which marks the legal
completion of the adoption.
b. Independent Adoptions
Under most circumstances, the UAA and a few states require
a homestudy prior to an adoptive placement for independent adop-
tions.20 1 However, the majority of states impose no such require-
ment.202 In most independent adoptions, the biggest hurdle facing
the parents is identifying a potential "match." This is often done
through word of mouth, but sometimes via classified advertising or
other means.203 After both the biological and prospective adoptive
parents agree that the match is suitable20 4 and the child is born,
205
the child is placed in the adoptive home. 206 If there has not been a
pre-placement homestudy, there will often be a post-placement
home visit.207 After an appropriate waiting period, the adoptive
parents obtain a judicial decree finalizing the adoption.
2. Application of the ADA
Although there are a variety of scenarios by which an adop-
tion may be completed, there are common elements that are the
most likely to be abused when persons with disability attempt to
adopt. This section will analyze the application of the ADA to the
homestudy, the primary tool used to assess the fitness of prospec-
particularly in private adoptions.
199. Under current regulations of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
the adoptee need not be an "orphan" in the traditional sense of the word, but
rather must be "abandoned" according to the laws of the placing country. See 8
C.F.R. § 204.3 (1995). All international adoptions must be preceded by a
homestudy. See id.
200. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-601, 9 U.L.A- at 57; see also ALA. CODE § 26-
1OA-19(c) (1975); CAL. FAM. CODE § 226.69 (West 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.8
(West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-31 (Michie 1978).
201. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25-23-100 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §3
8-120, 8-121, 8-129 (West 1993); UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-201, 9 U.L.A. 20 (Supp.
1997).
202. See HOLLINGER, supra note 184, § 4.12[21[b].
203. See id. § 1.0513].
204. Sometimes this is accomplished without the birth and adoptive parents
meeting.
205. See supra note 198.
206. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (explaining that it is not un-
common for an adoptive assignment to occur prior to the adoptee's birth).
207. See, e.g., UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-601, 9 U.L.A. at 57.
1998]
Law and Inequality
tive adoptive parents. Although the potential for discrimination
against persons with disability exists during other stages of the
adoption process, particularly the placement decision 208 and the
judicial finalization,20 9 the homestudy analysis is representative of
most of the applicable issues and law.2 10
In the case of adoptions in which some of the work is per-
formed by a private adoption agency, any ADA violations would be
analyzed under Title 111.211 At least one court has held that Title
III's "place of public accommodation"212 language limits its appli-
208. Discrimination during the placement process, independent of the
homestudy process, raises difficult issues. If the agency works with international
placements, the foreign government may impose unusual or irrational restrictions
on the agency. (For example, China permits adoptions of "healthy" infants only
when both parents are over 35 and the couple is infertile. FAMILIES ADOPTING
CHILDREN EVERYWHERE, THE FACE ADOPTION RESOURCE MANUAL 57 (Clyde Tol-
ley ed., 6th ed., 1993); Korea permits adoptions of infants only by couples married
for at least three years, see id. at 43). It is also possible that birthmothers in the
United States who might place their babies via an agency might react negatively
to adoptive parents with disabilities. The ADA is unlikely to prevent such dis-
criminatory practices because it does not apply to individuals. See, e.g., Simenson
v. Hoffman, No. 95 C 1401, 1995 WL 631804, at *4 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 24, 1995)
(holding that Title III does not support a finding of individual liability, even when
the individual exerts considerable control and authority in operating a place of
public accommodation). Under these circumstances, adoptive parents might be
better served by using separate agencies for the homestudy and the placement. If
they obtain an approved homestudy, without limitation, they may succeed in per-
suading a placement agency to continue working with them (particularly if the
placement agency is located in a different state and will have no independent op-
portunity to assess or evaluate the adoptive parents).
209. In the only reported decision of a claim of disability discrimination during
adoption, In the Matter of Scott J. Richardson, 59 Cal. Rptr. 323 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967), a judge denied an adoption petition filed by a deaf couple with an approved
homestudy. See id. at 334. At one point during the proceedings, the judge said the
following:
Is this a normally happy home? There is no question about it, it is a
happy home, but is it a normal home? I don't think the Court could make
a finding that it is a normal home when these poor unfortunate people,
they are handicapped, and what can they do in the way of bringing this
child up to be the type of citizen we want him to be.
Id. at 327. All the presented evidence indicated that the petitioners were model
parents and had successfully raised other children. In short, there was no evi-
dence to support the trial judge's denial. The denial was overturned on appeal,
primarily on the grounds of a state statute which prohibited "bias" and "prejudice"
in judicial actions. See id. Among the many experts who intervened on behalf of
the parents was Judge Homer Thornberry, then of the United States Court of Ap-
peals. Thornberry, who was raised by deaf parents, wrote "I have never personally
known of a hearing child with deaf parents who did not grow and develop into a
worthwhile and fairly successful person." Id. at 328.
210. Although other stages of the adoption process might also raise interesting
and novel issues concerning the ADA's applications, such issues are beyond the
scope of this Article.
211. See infra note 214.
212. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (a) (1994).
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cability to physical facilities. 2 13 If followed, this limitation could
affect claims against an adoption agency that has no "place of pub-
lic accommodation," but that instead performs its public services
dispersed throughout the community. However, this limitation
seems unlikely to persist. First, it seems to circumvent the clear
intent of the ADA; Congress surely did not mean to suggest that a
public entity could discriminate at will merely by providing serv-
ices without a "place." More importantly, Congress' inclusion of
adoption agencies as a statutorily specified example of a public ac-
commodation 214 seems to settle the issue in this regard.2 15
A similar concern addresses "independent" evaluators, who
are usually licensed social workers not affiliated with agencies.
The UAA explicitly anticipates the use of such evaluators. 216 The
commentary accompanying Title II's regulations states that "Title
II coverage... is not limited to "Executive" agencies, but includes
activities of the legislative and judicial branches of State and local
governments. All governmental activities of public entities are
covered, even if they are carried out by contractors."2 17 On the
other hand, Title III is not likely to apply to individuals, although
it may apply to "public accommodations" operated by individu-
als.2 18 Thus, an individual evaluator might escape liability for dis-
crimination if the court applies a Title III analysis and is per-
suaded that the individual did not operate a public
accommodation. However, the court might also be persuaded that
an individual evaluator was an "instrumentality" of the govern-
ment, if the judiciary is awaiting the results of the evaluation. In
such a case, Title II would apply.219
213. "[A] plaintiff bringing an ADA claim against an organization must allege
and prove sufficient facts to support a conclusion that the organization is in some
way connected to a particular place of public accommodation." Schaaf v. Associa-
tion of Educ. Therapists, No. C 94-03315 CW, 1995 WL 381979, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
June 13, 1995) (citing Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir.
1994) (interpreting parallel context of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C §
2000a, using the same public accommodations language as the ADA)).
214. "The following private entities are considered public accommodations for
purposes of this title ... (K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shel-
ter, food bank, adoption agency, or other social service center establishment .
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994) (emphasis added).
215. Note that Title II does not include language that could limit its application
to particular "places." Instead, all state and local government services are covered
under Title II.
216. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-202 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 1997).
217. ADA HANDBOOK, supra note 142, at 11-9 (emphasis added).
218. See Simenson v. Hoffman, No. 95 C 1401, 1995 WL 631804, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 24, 1995) (establishing a test to differentiate between individuals and public
accommodations owned, leased or operated by individuals).




Most non-relative adoptions are preceded by one or more
evaluations of the adoptive home (homestudies).220 Some states
require that a state agency must conduct the pre-placement
evaluations,221 but others allow any licensed child placement
agency to complete a homestudy.222 In most cases, the evaluator is
a social worker, but the credentials and qualifications of
homestudy workers vary widely among jurisdictions. 223  The
homestudy process may also vary widely, even within the same lo-
cality, depending upon the attitude and diligence of the individual
evaluator. 224 Adoption advocates encourage prospective adoptive
parents to be as active as possible in the selection of the evaluator
because of this wide variation and because of the importance of the
homestudy in the adoption process. 225
The content of a homestudy is also subject to great varia-
tion.226 Most state statutes describe the required content in very
general terms, if at all,227 leaving the form and content of the study
to the evaluator. The UAA specifies ten required elements, 228 but
attention.
220. HOLLINGER, supra note 184, § 4.12. However, most states and the UAA
dispense with this requirement for step-parent adoptions, and many eliminate the
homestudy for independent adoptions. See id.; see also UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 4-
111, 9 U.L.A. at 72.
221. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10A-19(d)(1) (1996).
222. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-209 (1996).
223. See HOLLINGER, supra note 184, § 4.12[1][lb].
224. "Social studies and investigation reports may be comprehensive and useful,
or cursory and useless." Id. § 4.12.
225. See id. § 4.12[1][a].
226. See id. § 4.12[2].
227. See id.
228. The section of the Act specifying the elements reads as follows:
(d) A preplacement evaluation must contain the following information
about the individual being evaluated:
(1) age and date of birth, nationality, racial or ethnic background, and
any religious affiliation;
(2) marital status and family history, including the age and location of
any child of the individual and the identity of and relationship to any-
one else living in the individual's household;
(3) physical and mental health, and any history of abuse of alcohol
and drugs;
(4) educational and employment history and any special skills;
(5) property and income, including outstanding financial obligations
as indicated in a current credit report or financial statement fur-
nished by the individual;
(6) any previous request for an evaluation or involvement in an adop-
tive placement and the outcome of the evaluation or placement;
(7) whether the individual has been charged with having committed
domestic violence or a violation of [the State's child protection stat-
ute], and the disposition of the charges, or whether the individual is
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also lacks any substantive criteria to be used in making the
homestudy evaluation. To summarize, most jurisdictions seem to
agree that some sort of prospective evaluation is appropriate be-
fore adoption, at least in non-relative adoptions, and there seems
to be general agreement as to the kinds of issues to be evaluated.
However, there are no standards for evaluating the findings of the
homestudy or for the ultimate approval or disapproval of the pro-
spective parents. It seems reasonable to conclude that the indi-
vidual evaluator will have a tremendous amount of discretion
when conducting a homestudy, perhaps making it easier for dis-
crimination to be a part of the process.
A homestudy may discriminate on the basis of disability in
two ways. First, the evaluator may simply refuse to approve any
adoptive placement, judging the parents unsuitable to raise any
child. Second, the evaluator may limit the approval of an adoptive
placement to only those children deemed compatible with the dis-
ability of the adoptive parent.229 Thus, an evaluator may conclude
that a paraplegic couple is incapable of caring for any child, but
that a blind couple is capable of caring only for a blind child,230 and
may approve homestudies accordingly. As previously discussed,
the stereotypes and societal attitudes concerning parents with dis-
abilities are pervasive and powerful. 231 Even evaluators trained to
assess parental fitness are capable of falling victim to these preju-
dices. Social worker texts, for example, continue to propagate the
subject to a court order restricting the individual's right to custody or
visitation with a child;
(8) whether the individual has been convicted of a crime other than a
minor traffic violation;
(9) whether the individual has located a parent interested in placing a
minor with the individual for adoption and, if so, a brief description of
the parent and the minor; and
(10) any other fact or circumstance that may be relevant in deter-
mining whether the individual is suited to be an adoptive parent, in-
cluding the quality of the environment in the individual's home and
the functioning of other children in the individual's household.
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-203, 9 U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
229. This second variety of negative homestudy could include an approved
homestudy that is less than 100% supportive because of one or both parents' dis-
abilities.
230. A blind couple wrote about such an experience in a recent magazine article.
See Nadine Jacobson as told to Bill Holton, Loving Elizabeth: A Blind Couple's
Struggle to Adopt a Baby, FAMILY CIRCLE, Oct. 10, 1995, at 94. Of particular note
is the fact that neither parent's blindness was genetic. See id. at 95. Thus, like the
vast majority of blind couples, they would probably have had sighted biological
children if they were able to conceive. See id. at 95.
231. See supra Part I.B.
1998]
Law and Inequality
paternalistic tendencies that conclude that disability is an impor-
tant factor in assessing parental fitness. 23 2
What, then, can the hopeful adoptive parents with a negative
homestudy do? The UAA permits judicial review of any disap-
proved homestudy, 23 3 but does not specify reviewing standards. It
is also silent on the issue of "limited approval" homestudies. As
will be developed below, the ADA may offer a remedy, but several
non-legal issues limit its usefulness. Situations in which the
evaluating agency will also be making the placement decision put
the adoptive parents in a terrible quandary: alienating the agency
by initiating an ADA claim may jeopardize the placement process,
a risk that many adoptive parents may be unwilling to take. Even
where two different agencies will be making the homestudy and
placement decisions, adoptive parents may fear that expressing
dissatisfaction about the homestudy process or outcome could be
communicated between the different agencies and might jeopard-
ize the adoption. Finally, parents may be afraid to "cause trouble"
during the present adoption out of fear that any future adoptions
might be jeopardized. These fears may hinder prospective adop-
tive parents from seeking legal relief, regardless of the strength of
their legal claims and despite specific regulations explicitly de-
signed to protect them from retaliation. 2 4 Thus, rather than initi-
ating an ADA claim, these parents may be more likely either to re-
apply with another agency, or delay their adoption plans in the
hopes that they can "rehabilitate" themselves to the agency's satis-
faction.235
When adoptive parents do resort to legal action, they face
many difficulties. Almost all homestudies conclude with a written
report, including detailed explanation in the case of unapproved
232. "Couples where one mate is physically handicapped may be considered,
provided that they meet the foregoing health requirements and are emotionally
well adjusted to the handicap." Donald Brieland, Selection of Adoptive Parents, in
ADOPTION: CURRENT ISSUES AND TRENDS 65, 73 (Paul Sachdev ed., 1984) (quoting
the 1978 Standards for Adoption Services promulgated by the Child Welfare
League of America) (emphasis added). Presumably, couples where both mates are
physically handicapped, or either mate is mentally handicapped, would never be
considered.
233. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-206, 9 U.L.A. at 23.
234. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.134 (1996); id. § 36.206.
235. The situation is similar to that of a medical malpractice plaintiff needing
an operation in a one-surgeon town. Few patients would want to undergo an op-
eration performed by a doctor with whom they-are engaged in a legal struggle, no
matter how competent the physician, or how valid the legal claim. The situation
improves only slightly if there are other surgeons in town, especially if the original
surgeon was selected for particular characteristics (such as skill), as is often the
case in the selection of an adoption agency.
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applicants.236 Assuming the evaluator bases the disapproval (or
limited approval)237 on one or both adoptive parents' disability,238
the parents should first exhaust any formal or informal appeals
process within the evaluator's administrative structure. Should
this fail, however, the aggrieved parents can file an ADA claim
under Title II or Title III, depending on the nature of the discrimi-
nating agency. 239 If, in fact, a negative homestudy is found to be
based on the prospective parents' disability, the evaluator may
raise several claims in its defense.
b. Defenses
i. Defense: "Fundamental Alteration"
The evaluator may claim that its negative homestudy, al-
though based upon a parent's disability, is necessary to avoid
"fundamentally altering"240 the nature of its program. This de-
fense might be raised, for example, by an adoption agency affili-
ated with a religious entity that is opposed to parenting by HIV-
infected individuals because it believes HIV to be "punishment" for
misbehavior. 241 More generally, an evaluator might argue that its
"source" of adoptable children could be threatened if it began to
approve placements of children with parents with disabilities.
242
236. See, e.g., UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-204(c), 9 U.L.A. at 22.
237. Hereinafter, a limited approval and a disapproval will be considered jointly
and will be referred to as a "negative homestudy." Of course, if the prospective
parents obtain a limited approval and are comfortable with the limitation, the
homestudy should instead be considered approved.
238. This analysis ignores the potential problems in discerning the "true" moti-
vations behind negative homestudy. The difficulty of determining whether
"discrimination based upon disability" has in fact occurred is not unique to paren-
tal fitness evaluations and is not addressed in this Article.
239. There may be an issue as to whether a private agency acting on the behalf
of the state falls within Title II or Title III, but the analysis proceeds generally the
same. For information on specific differences between the Titles, see discussion
supra Part II.
240. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(2)(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994) (stating that failure to modify
does not constitute discrimination if the modification would fundamentally alter
the nature of services).
241. This view of the AIDS epidemic has been linked to, among others, certain
religious bodies. See, e.g., Margaret Farnham, In Farm Country, Few Know How
to Deal with Issue of AIDS, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June 4, 1995, at 6B (quoting an
AIDS prevention educator as saying "we still have ministers in the rural communi-
ties saying HIV and AIDS is God's punishment").
242. For example, an agency dealing with international placements might argue
that the foreign government requires it to place children only in households
meeting a certain profile. An agency that does not provide placement services
would have more difficulty in making such a claim. See generally supra note 208
(describing foreign governments' restrictions upon placement and the ADA's inap-
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This claim bears some resemblance to the "customer preference"
claims sometimes raised in the employment discrimination con-
text. However, the "customer preference" claim has not generally
been accepted by the courts. 243 Although there could be merit to
such a claim in the adoption context, any legal challenge necessar-
ily would be fact-specific, and would probably require the evalua-
tor to articulate, with particularity, reasons why it could not pro-
vide a non-discriminatory homestudy without a fundamental
alteration to the nature of the program. The Arline Court specifi-
cally rejected reasoning that would consider the non-dangerous ef-
fects of a disability on others (including fellow employees of a
worker with disability, students of a teacher with disability, and
fellow students of a student with disability), 244 and it seems likely
that the customer preference defense will fail under the ADA un-
der all but the most unusual circumstances. The UAA on the other
hand, requires a placing agency to consider the "characteristics re-
quested by a [birth] parent" when making a placement decision. 245
The possibility that an adoption agency might risk "losing" some of
its adoptable children seems too remote, and too like the conven-
tional "customer preference" situation, to permit the agency to
prevail on such a claim, but the wishes of the birth parents of a
specific child would, under the UAA, be binding.246
ii. Defense: "No Discrimination"
Perhaps the most obvious defense to an assertion of an ADA
violation would be for the evaluator to claim that no discrimination
occurred. There is little likelihood that a reviewing court would
find that Congress intended that people with disability be assured
of an approved homestudy. If the evaluator performs a less thor-
plicability to the discriminatory placement preferences of birth mothers).
243. See, e.g., Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1993)
(purported customer preference for clean-shaven pizza deliverymen not valid busi-
ness justification defense); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (customer preference for female flight
attendants not "bona fide occupational qualification").
244. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282-84 (1987) (explaining that Con-
gress intended to prohibit discrimination against incidental effects of being dis-
abled).
245. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-104(b)(2), 9 U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 1997).
246. The question of whether an adoption agency might violate the ADA if it
refused to approve any prospective parents with disability because of the prefer-
ences of the specific placing birth parent is different from an agency's belief or per-
ception that birth parents, in general, would decline to place babies with the
agency if the agency approved parents with disability. Although there is no case




ough homestudy, or in some way distinguishes this homestudy
from those performed for the nondisabled, then this defense should
fail immediately. However, the evaluator could argue that the
"service" 247 it provides is the evaluation process, rather than the
desired final product, an approved homestudy. This possible de-
fense has some appeal, but ultimately should be discounted, as it
masks the true controversy: the fitness of the prospective parents.
The actual service offered should be considered to be a fair and
non-discriminatory homestudy. Since the discriminatory nature of
the negative homestudy is at issue, determining whether the par-
ents received a fair homestudy is equivalent to determining
whether they are, in fact, suitable parents. 248 Moreover, the ADA
prohibits the use of "standards or criteria or methods of admini-
stration-(i) that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of
disability; or (ii) that perpetuate the discrimination of others who
are subject to common administrative control."249  Thus, an
agency's use of eligibility criteria that are not specifically related
to parenting ability, and that are nondiscriminatory on their face
but would disproportionately impact parents with disability, would
violate the ADA.250
iii. Defense: "Direct Threat"
As could ARTs providers, 25' evaluators may claim the need
for a negative homestudy in order to protect the interests of the
prospective adoptee. As noted previously, the "direct threat" de-
fense requires an individualized determination that an actual risk
exists. 252 Unlike the presentation in the ARTs child-rearing con-
247. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994); id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)().
248. The UAA prohibits the use of race for placement purposes unless requested
by the birth parent. See UNIF. ADOPTION AcT § 2-104(c), 9 U.L.A. at 15. The UAA,
however, does call for consideration of the parent's "racial or ethnic background" in
the pre-placement evaluation. See id. § 2-203(d)(1), 9 U.L.A. at 21. Thus, the UAA
may be read as requiring a non-discriminatory homestudy with regard to race, ab-
sent birth parent preference. Extending this notion to disability discrimination
would support an ADA claim.
249. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(D).
250. For example, an agency policy that adoptive parents must demonstrate
some minimum income might violate the ADA, since people with disabilities have
also been subject to employment and economic discrimination and might thereby
be disproportionately impacted. The ADA's defenses would remain available. No
reported opinion has addressed a claim of this type, so interpretation of the inter-
play between these ADA provisions is, thus far, speculative.
251. See supra Part III.A.2.a.ii (describing how ARTs providers might substitute
their own social judgments for a parental fitness evaluation under the pretext of
protecting the child as a third party).
252. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text (explaining the standards
for a "direct threat" defense under the ADA).
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text, however, in the case of a negative homestudy, the evaluator
who argues the existence of the threat is, presumably, well-
qualified to offer such an opinion.25 3 Just as in the case of the "no
discrimination" defense, this defense ultimately devolves into a de-
termination of whether the prospective parents do, in fact, repre-
sent a threat to an adoptee. In other words, are they suitable par-
ents?2 5
4
c. The Real Issues: The Standard of Review and the
Burden of Proof
In most instances of a legal dispute over a negative
homestudy in which the prospective parents claim disability dis-
crimination, the true issue in controversy is the "suitability" of the
parents. In this context, it is assumed that an evaluator, with
training and expertise in the area, has considered this issue and
has concluded that the parents are not suitable. 255 From the per-
spective of a legal challenge to this determination, then, the court
must determine whether the evaluator's decision is to be upheld or
reversed in reviewing a claim under a state statute unrelated to a
discrimination charge 256 or the ADA. However, the questions re-
main as to what standard of review and what burden of proof the
253. At least, an evaluator is as well-qualified as is possible. Given that there is
no serious movement toward completely eliminating pre-placement evaluations,
social workers trained to make such evaluations would appear to be the best ex-
perts available. Because the agencies involved in an adoption have the responsi-
bility for acting as surrogates of the child's parents, pre-placement evaluations of-
fer the best opportunity available for protecting the children, despite their
limitations and reliance on uncertain prognostication.
254. In the case of a limited approval homestudy, this issue is simplified to
whether approval without the limitation poses a "direct threat" to the adoptee. In
practice, the limited approval may be beneficial to the prospective parents, because
they could use the limited approval to demonstrate that, at least under the cir-
cumstances of the limitation, they are fit parents. The burden would then shift to
the evaluator to demonstrate, under the "actual risk" standards, why the limita-
tion offers protection to the adoptee. In short, the parents can compel the evalua-
tor to justify the limitation using the same standards that would apply under a
total disapproval. This is likely to be difficult given the Arline Court's rigorous
standards. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
255. This Article does not attempt to address the important question of the ap-
propriate standard for determining the suitability of a parent for an adoptive
placement as compared to the suitability of a parent for continued custody where
the state tries to remove a child. Whether the standards should be the same for
adoption and TPR proceedings remains unresolved, although presently, in most
cases adoption standards are more stringent. This Article will use the terms
"suitable" and "unsuitable" in the adoption context, and the terms "fit" and "unfit"
in the TPR context, without implying any relative comparisons between them.
256. For example, any person receiving a negative homestudy may obtain judi-
cial review under the UAA. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-206, 9 U.L.A. 23-24
(Supp. 1997) (setting forth procedure for review of evaluation).
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court should employ. In theory, the court could conduct a de novo
review of all available evidence, employing any burden of proof, or
it could accept the evaluator's decision as correct, overturning it
only upon a finding of some degree of error.
The UAA places the burden of proving parenting suitability
"by a preponderance of the evidence" upon the prospective parent
challenging a homestudy conclusion.257 Presumably, the court un-
der these circumstances would conduct a de novo review. The pro-
spective parent would then have two ways to prove suitability: lay
testimony by family members and acquaintances or expert testi-
mony by qualified professionals. The first option presumes that
the ability to evaluate parental suitability is within the general
knowledge of the lay public. If this is true, then the parent might
be able to prove suitability without resort to some sort of expert
testimony. For the parent to prevail without the need for expert
testimony, however, the reviewing judge would have to be per-
suaded that lay knowledge of what constitutes suitability out-
weighs the more learned knowledge of the defendant evaluator. If
this is possible, there would seem to be no need for trained evalu-
ators. The second way of proving suitability requires the parent to
obtain expert testimony to rebut the evaluator's negative report.
This option seems more reasonable, and perhaps makes sense in
the context of the UAA's goals, which do not focus on discrimina-
tion. However, requiring the prospective parent to obtain favor-
able expert testimony under these circumstances is equivalent to
obtaining an approved homestudy after initial failure. Where the
challenged homestudy was prey to prejudice and discrimination,
this may be a difficult or impossible task.258 Moreover, the fact
that the victim of discrimination may be able to procure goods or
services after a search for a less biased source does not ameliorate
the initial discrimination or diminish the applicability of the ADA.
The ADA, however, differs from the UAA in its allocation of
the burden of proof. When a court is asked to review an evaluation
of parental suitability rendered during a negative adoption
homestudy, the evaluator should have to prove, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, 25 9 the unsuitability of the prospective parent.
257. See id. § 2-206(b), 9 U.L.A. at 24.
258. See supra Part I.B (giving examples of discrimination against parents with
disabilities). If at least one evaluator providing the negative homestudy harbors
these prejudices, it is possible that some, many, or all other evaluators may harbor
the same prejudices.
259. This Article argues for a preponderance of the evidence burden, rather
than the clear and convincing evidence burden employed in the TPR context. In
the adoption context, the rights of the prospective parents, while significant, do not
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That is, once the prospective parent has proven that a disability
not only exists but was the basis for the negative homestudy,260 the
evaluator should be required to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the prospective parent is unsuitable. This standard
more closely parallels the standards inherent in the ADA for the
"direct threat" defense. 26 1 Congress, when enacting the ADA, rec-
ognized that the "direct threat" defense might be employed as a
pretext for discrimination, and decided to place upon defendants
the initial burden of conducting an individualized determina-
tion. 262 Thus when hearing an ADA claim, the trial court should
conduct a de novo review, 263 with the defendant carrying the bur-
den of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence
of a direct threat. The test under this standard has remained es-
sentially unchanged since enunciated by the Supreme Court in
School Board vs. Arline264 and was incorporated into the ADA al-
most verbatim. 265
Any concern that this places unreasonable demands upon de-
fendants should be tempered by the realization that the plaintiff
(in this case the prospective adoptive parent) must first establish a
prima facie case by showing discrimination on the basis of disabil-
ity. Moreover, because the defendant should possess expert
rise to the level of those of the parents involved in a TPR proceeding, who have a
pre-existing relationship that is threatened (although the risk of harm to the child
may be greater in the TPR context, in that there is some past record indicating a
reason for the child's removal, barring the possible effects of prejudice and dis-
crimination).
260. See supra Part II (discussing the ADA and basic elements of an ADA
claim).
261. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
262. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(111) at 62, (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, stating that the standards to be applied to a Title III "direct
threat" claim are identical to those for a Title I claim; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No.
101-596, (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565, 569 (placing burden for
"direct threat" claims on employer, not employee).
263. "Review" may be an inappropriate term under circumstances in which the
initial determination of a threat was cursory or informal.
264. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), (defining the parameters of a
"direct threat" defense under the Rehab Act); see supra notes 65, 101 and accom-
panying text.
265. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text. Arline might be inter-
preted as placing greater weight on the "individualized determination" conducted
by the defendant before the court proceeding than ordinarily suggested by a de
novo review, particularly when there is evidence of some degree of medical risk.
However, the Court in Arline actually remanded the case, directing the district
court to "conduct an individualized inquiry and make appropriate findings of fact."
480 U.S. at 287. Thus, there is no suggestion that courts owe any particular defer-
ence to the findings of any pre-court individualized determination even when of-
fered by a competent expert.
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knowledge in the field of determining parental suitability deter-
minations, this is a reasonable allocation of the burdens.
3. Adoption: Conclusions
In terms of the analytical categories of parents with disabili-
ties described above, 266 the purpose of the homestudy should be to
identify to which category the prospective parents belong. Parents
who are evaluated as suitable presumably have received an ap-
proved homestudy by the evaluator and thus need not resort to
litigation. If an evaluator concludes that the parents are unsuit-
able and the prospective parents wish to dispute the conclusion,
the presiding court should require the evaluator to substantiate
the unsuitable determination by a preponderance of the evidence,
if the parents can first demonstrate disability discrimination. In
conducting its de novo review, the court should uphold the evalua-
tor's decision only if the evaluator has demonstrated that the pro-
spective parents fit into the "never suitable" category of parents, or
if the prospective parents fit into the "suitable with help" category
but are unable to demonstrate the availability of the required as-
sistance.267
IV. Parents with Disabilities Maintaining Families
Once a family is formed, whether by biology, science, or law,
the Constitution offers significant protection against state en-
croachment. 268 However, under appropriate circumstances, the
government may interfere with, or even destroy, the parent-child
relationship. This section of the Article will discuss the steps
taken when the state wishes to remove a child from his or her par-
ent's home, or to seek a termination of parental rights (TPR) of a
parent with disability by reason of parental neglect, 269 and will ex-
266. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (explaining the analytical
categories of parents and their utility depending on the specific circumstances).
The reasons for not rejecting "suitable with help" parents are similar to those in
the ARTs context, see supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text, although the
argument is less compelling in the adoption context. Assuming that a prospective
parent does in fact need help to remain suitable, requiring the parent to demon-
strate the availability of that help prior to approving a homestudy seems war-
ranted because, again, the evaluator bears the "parental" responsibility for assur-
ing the adequacy of a placement. See supra note 174 (comparing determinations of
necessary assistance for those "suitable with help" with usual pre-adoption evalua-
tions).
268. See supra Part L.A (citing decisions protecting parents' rights).
269. Although there are other grounds for terminating parental rights, the ne-
glect context provides the clearest analysis for disability discrimination because it
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amine the extent to which the ADA may impose additional obliga-
tions on states before they initiate or finalize these proceedings.
A. Intervention in the Parent-Child Relationship
Although the procedures for interfering with the parent-child
relationship are governed largely by varying state laws, there are
some generalities that are widely applicable.270 In most cases in
which parental neglect is to be employed as the basis for a removal
or TPR order, the process consists of several distinct stages. The
first stage, sometimes referred to as the "jurisdictional" stage, 271
usually focuses on the condition of the child, and is often subject to
the jurisdiction of a juvenile court. 272 After a child's condition is
brought to the attention of a local social-services agency, 273 the
agency conducts a preliminary investigation. Based on its find-
ings, the agency determines whether continued intervention is
necessary. Many states refer to a child in these circumstances as a
"child in need of assistance" (often abbreviated as CINA or
CHINA).274 If the preliminary investigation substantiates the
need for intervention, a fact-finder 275 hears evidence and, if appro-
does not necessarily require volitional fault. For example, in the case of an abu-
sive parent with a disability, separating the weight placed on the abuse from that
placed on the disability may be difficult, but the analysis would be similar to that
in the neglect context.
270. When necessary, Maryland law will be used for purposes of illustration,
with appropriate commentary to describe areas of significant interstate variation.
271. See Julie Odegard, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Creating "Family
Values" for Physically Disabled Parents, 11 LAW & INEQ. J. 533, 538 (1993).
272. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-801(i) (1995).
273. This may occur in several ways, from reports by school officials to anony-
mous phone calls by prejudiced, or even malicious, neighbors. Most local service
agencies are obligated to investigate all complaints, see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 5-706 (1995), but resource limitations almost certainly affect the diligence
with which they conduct such investigations. As is common with most states, cer-
tain categories of citizens are obligated to report suspected abuse or neglect. Id. §
5-704 (requiring reports by health practitioners, police officers, educators, and
human service workers). Maryland also includes a reporting requirement that all
Maryland citizens have a duty to report suspected child abuse. Id. § 5-705. For a
review of state reporting laws and state investigative efforts, see DONALD T.
KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, §§ 16.14-16.22 (1994).
The widely-reported case of Leigh Campbell-Earl and Bill Earl, see supra
notes 35-37 and accompanying text, started with an anonymous phone call to the
Ingham County, Michigan, Department of Social Services, prior to the birth of
their child. "There is a woman in East Lansing, Mich., about to have a baby, the
caller said, and she is far too disabled to care for it. Her husband uses a wheel-
chair, too. Shouldn't the county investigate... ?" Mathews, supra note 30, at Z10.
274. Other popular labels include "child in need of services" (CHINS) or "child in
need of protective services" (CHIPS). This Article will refer to such a child as a
"child in need of assistance" (CINA).
275. In Maryland, CINA proceedings are brought by local departments of social
services. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-810 (1995). Simultaneously,
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priate, adjudicates the child as a CINA. At this first stage, the lo-
cal social services agency must demonstrate the need for interven-
tion by a preponderance of the evidence. 276 After the child is adju-
dicated a CINA, the court determines whether removal of the child
from the home is necessary for the child's protection; if not, the
court may order services to be provided to the family to address
the needs of the child.277 If the court concludes that the CINA is in
danger of future harm,278 it may order the removal of the child,
usually into a group home or to foster care. If the court removes
the child from his or her home at this second stage, sometimes re-
ferred to as the "dispositional" stage, 279 it usually must make
"specific findings of fact as to the circumstances that caused the
need for the removal."280 The state also assumes an obligation to
formulate a plan for family reunification, or, if the state is con-
vinced that this family will never be successfully reunited, a plan
for TPR. 28 1 The federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
of 1980 (AA&CWA), as amended, provides states with substantial
federal monies for child welfare programs conditioned on the pro-
vision of family preservation services in an attempt to avoid TPR
proceedings. 282 Most states (perhaps all), additionally require the
court to find that the local social services agency offered reason-
social services departments may pursue administrative investigations, which are
stayed pending the outcome of a CINA proceeding. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 5-706.1 (1995). The fact-finder in a CINA proceeding will generally be a circuit
court judge, although Maryland does permit a 'Master" to conduct CINA hearings
under certain circumstances. See id., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-813.
276. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-819; see also Odegard, su-
pra note 271, at 538.
277. See MD. CODE ANN., oTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-820.
278. The standards for proceeding at this stage vary widely by state, and are
usually specified by statute. In Maryland, a CINA disposition including the re-
moval of the child from the home may lead to the filing of a petition for the termi-
nation of parental rights if the parents fail to make "significant progress to remedy
the circumstances" causing the CINA removal, and the "parents are unwilling or
unable to give the child proper care and attention within a reasonable period of
time." Id. § 3-820(k) (Supp. 1995).
279. See Odegard, supra note 271, at 539.
280. MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-820(k).
281. See id.
282. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272,
94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The federal
law conditions payment of at least 75% of a state's costs for family preservation
services and family support services on the maintenance of programs acceptable to
the federal government. See 42 U.S.C. § 629a (1995). The state is obligated to
create programs for family preservation services (services designed to prevent out-
of-home placements for children at risk, services designed to facilitate the return
to the home of children already in foster care and services designed to improve
parenting skills in at-risk families) and family support services (services designed
to increase the strength and stability of families in the community). See id.
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able services to the family in an attempt to avoid the necessity of
seeking a TPR order.28 3 If and when the state finally concludes
that family reunification is no longer realistic, it may petition for a
TPR order. The court may grant the TPR order if it finds by clear
and convincing evidence28 4 that the child's best interests require
the TPR and it finds, again by clear and convincing evidence, some
degree of parental unfitness. 285 Thus, the TPR proceeding, when
viewed in its entirety, is best seen as the intersection of varied re-
quirements imposed by state and federal statutes and constitu-
tions. Following the issuance of a TPR order, the child is placed
either in an adoptive home, or remains in foster care or some other
form of state care until the child is adopted or reaches the age of
majority.286
B. TPR, Parents with Disabilities, and the ADA
In a neglect proceeding involving parents with disabilities, an
ADA claim is unlikely to arise until the dispositional stage. 28 7 At
this point, the court has already found in the precedent CINA ad-
judicatory hearing that the child has suffered neglect. The evalua-
tion of parental fitness at the disposition hearing will be colored by
the finding of past neglect. The determination of the parent's fit-
ness 288 proceeds similarly to that described previously for adoption
homestudies, 28 9 except that there will be actual data for the par-
283. All states receive federal monies under the AA&CWA, which requires
agencies to make reasonable efforts to maintain a child in his or her parental
home. See Sackett, supra note 2, at 285. However, at least one court has held that
its state laws do not require any efforts to preserve the family prior to a TPR or-
der. See Stone v. Daviess, 656 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). This apparent con-
tradiction will be developed more fully infra Part IV.B.3.
284. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745 (1982)).
285. The standards for this stage vary according to statute.
286. The staggering problems with America's foster care system are well de-
scribed elsewhere. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 25.
287. The urgent and expedited nature of the jurisdictional hearing is unlikely to
permit a thorough examination of an ADA claim. This is not to suggest that dis-
crimination could not occur at the jurisdictional stage, or that significant harm
does not attend this discrimination; rather, this is only to point out that most
CINA proceedings are likely poor candidates for successful ADA claims. However,
disability discrimination should be raised at this stage and again in any subse-
quent court actions. Additionally, an aggrieved parent could bring a separate ADA
claim (which might seek money damages), see supra notes 76-80 and accompany-
ing text, but relief under a separate claim may be "too little too late" if one or more
children have already been removed from the home, temporarily or permanently.
288. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing whether the par-
ent is "always suitable," "suitable with help," or "never suitable").
289. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
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ents' relationship with this child, and there is a mandatory court
review of the caseworker's evaluation. 290 The ADA is unlikely to
change significantly the agency's determination, since Constitu-
tional and statutory requirements have already placed a high bur-
den on the state to prove the actual risk of harm.291 In other
words, determining to which category292 parents with disability
appropriately belong follows the same process as for parents with-
out disability. The potential for discrimination during this evalua-
tion process, while high because of pervasive prejudice, is sup-
posed to be mitigated by the requirement of judicial review and the
high evidentiary burden placed on the state to show (by clear and
convincing evidence at the TPR stage) that the statutory require-
ments for the child's removal have been met.293 Because the court
already conducts an individualized review in each removal or TPR
hearing, an aggrieved parent would not benefit from an additional
hearing to consider an ADA-based claim that the action is dis-
criminatory. 294 Although the court's focus in a TPR hearing would
not be the same as in an ADA claim, both require an individual-
ized determination, and as will be developed below, the goals of
290. The caseworker's investigation is similar to an adoption homestudy in
some respects. Both attempt to evaluate future parenting abilities. There are
several differences, however. Homestudies tend to be more relaxed and more
thorough, perhaps owing to the fact that the parents being evaluated pay the ex-
penses; in most cases, there is no adversarial nature to the adoption homestudy.
In fact, most adoption professionals view the homestudy more as an educational
tool for the prospective parents than as an evaluation mechanism. See FAMILIES
ADOPTING CHILDREN EVERYWHERE, supra note 208, at xv. Social services case-
workers tend to have very heavy workloads which may prevent them from devot-
ing as much time as they would like to each investigation. Also, in the present
context, a caseworker's investigation is likely to be influenced negatively by the
fact that the child has already been identified as "at-risk."
291. This is not to suggest that unwarranted discrimination does not taint this
proceeding, but rather that the ADA is unlikely to affect its outcome directly. The
increased public education that has accompanied the ADA will hopefully, with
time, affect these determinations indirectly. In short, the ADA does not seem to
offer a parent with disability much additional leverage during the investigation
stages. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing current attitudes
toward disability within the social work profession).
292. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing analytical catego-
ries of parents based on parenting abilities).
293. The ADA might be thought to affect this stage if the statute permitted a
judge to issue a TPR order based solely on the parents' disability, but the Constitu-
tion already requires some greater degree of culpability. See supra notes 23-24 and
accompanying text. Many states include disability as a factor to be considered.
See e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313 (d)(i) (1995). Moreover, the statute
itself could be challenged under the ADA if it permitted disability to be used im-
properly as a factor in removing a child from the parents' home.
294. In contrast to the adoption context, in which the ADA may shift the burden
of showing unsuitability to the evaluator, the burden to show unsuitability already
rests with the state in the TPR context.
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both may be considered concurrently. In short, the process by
which a state evaluates a parent's fitness is not the most likely
source of an ADA violation. Rather, it is what the state does after
making an evaluation that will most often determine whether it
has violated the ADA.
For those parents who are "suitable with help," the ADA does
significantly affect the state's obligations toward the family in the
provision of family preservation services (FPS) subsequent to re-
moval but prior to the TPR. Assuming that the determination of
the parents' status as "always suitable," "never suitable," or
"suitable with help"295 has been made correctly, there should arise
a set of secondary questions for "suitable with help" parents: what
services will transform them from unsuitable to suitable, and must
those "special" services, as opposed to the "standard" services pro-
vided to all parents, be provided before the court grants a removal
or TPR order?296 These secondary questions should be answered in
all cases considering "suitable with help" parents, not just those
involving parents with disability. However, the ADA may require
services different from or in addition to those provided to nondis-
abled "suitable with help" parents. In addition, parents with dis-
abilities may require more permanent services than non-disabled
parents who require temporary assistance to care for their chil-
dren. The ADA claim that parents with disability may make is
that the state provides FPS, but that those services do not address
the needs of parents with disability, 297 and, therefore, the state is
denying to parents with disability "the benefits of the services"
298
that are provided to nondisabled parents, in violation of the ADA.
Alternatively, the claim for different or additional services could be
viewed as a request for a "reasonable modification"299 that would
295. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
296. Assuming that the categorizations have been made properly, only the
"suitable with help" category is of interest. Properly identified "always suitable"
parents will not be the target of a TPR proceeding, and properly identified "never
suitable" parents should have their rights terminated. If the parents claim that
the categorization has not been made properly, the court's role is to review the
evaluation, as in the adoption context, but with the heightened "clear and con-
vincing" standard placed on the state.
297. For example, a state might provide skills-training services to parents who
need help, teaching them various parenting tasks. These would be of no use to a
parent whose only difficulty is limited mobility. If there were no services available
to help a parent with limited mobility, that parent would be denied any benefit of
the FPS program, no matter how good or how intensive the other services might
be.
298. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1995).
299. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1996).
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make the program nondiscriminatory. Both claims, however, pro-
ceed along the same analytic path.
Only Title II of the ADA applies to a claim of this type, since
it is a government entity (either state or local) that both provides
the FPS30 0 and seeks the removal or TPR order. Under the regula-
tions implementing the ADA, public entities must provide services
that are "as effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the
same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of
achievement as that provided to others."301 The benefit afforded
by FPS is the ability to enhance parenting skills and preserve the
integrity of the family, and programs must be designed to extend
the opportunity to receive this benefit equally to all families,
whether headed by parents with disability or by nondisabled par-
ents. A state cannot simply offer a fixed "menu" of family preser-
vation services that ignores the needs of families headed by par-
ents with disability without violating the ADA or qualifying for one
of the ADA's defenses. 302 The ADA is clear: states must change the
way they approach the provision of services, even if it involves ex-
pense, unless an ADA defense applies. It is to be expected that
states will sometimes resist these changes (particularly if they have
negative budgetary effects), but that is the whole point of the
ADA.303 States, employers, and public accommodations were not
300. Under the ADA, if a private entity provides services under contract with
the state, Title II applies. "A public entity, in providing any aid, benefit, or service,
may not, directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, on the
basis of disability (i) deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to
participate in or benefit from the aid .... Id. § 35.130(b)(1).
301. Id. § 35.130(b)(1)(iii).
302. Although there is not yet case law to support this assertion, the language
of the statute and its implementing regulations is clear.
"[Plublic entit[ies], in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not, di-
rectly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, on the ba-
sis of disability -
(i) Deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to
participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service;
(ii) Afford a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to
participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not
equal to that afforded others;
(iii) Provide a qualified individual with a disability with an aid, bene-
fit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity to
obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same
level of achievement as that provided to others;
(vii) Otherwise limit a qualified individual with a disability in the en-
joyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by
others receiving the aid, benefit, or service.
Id. § 35.130(b)(1) (1996) (emphasis added).
303. "It is the purpose of [the ADA] ... to invoke the sweep of Congressional
authority, including the power to enforce the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment... in or-
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in the past providing equal services to individuals with disabilities.
If states, alone, could be expected to decide for themselves their
obligations under the ADA, there would have been no need for its
enactment. In response to an ADA claim brought pursuant to the
provision of allegedly discriminatory FPS, public entities are most
likely to assert the "reasonable modification,"30 4 "direct threat,"305
and "undue burden"30 6 defenses. 30 7
1. Defense: Reasonable Modification
ADA claims related to the allegedly discriminatory provision
of FPS are likely to focus on one or both of two related characteris-
tics of the preservation efforts: the specific nature of the family
preservation services and the duration for which those services
must be offered. In the first instance, the parent with disability
claims that the services offered do not address his or her disability-
der to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities." 42 U.S.C. 12102(b). Because the Fourteenth Amendment is directed
at state action, the explicit reference to its powers clearly indicates Congress' belief
that at least some states might need to be compelled, against their will, to end dis-
ability discrimination.
304. Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination against a "qualified individual
with a disability." Id. § 12132. "The term 'qualified individual with a disability'
means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifica-
tions to rules, policies, or practices ... meets the essential eligibility requirements
for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by
a public entity." Id. § 12131.
305. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text (articulating standards
later incorporated into the regulations implementing a "direct threat" defense for
Title III of the ADA, and the likely availability of the defense to a Title II defen-
dant).
306. See infra note 315 (discussing the "undue burden" defense under Title II).
307. The "fundamental alteration" defense, see 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(1996),
devolves into either the "undue burden" or the "direct threat" defense upon analy-
sis. The purpose of FPS programs is to keep families together and to protect chil-
dren. See 42 U.S.C. § 629(a) (1995). To effect a fundamental alteration of such a
program would suggest an impediment to that purpose. An argument that pro-
viding different, additional, or longer lasting FPS to parents with disability creates
such an impediment requires either that the additional or different services divert
resources from other aspects of the program thereby preventing other families
from being preserved (which is really an undue burden defense), or that the addi-
tional or different services somehow threaten the child's safety (which is really a
direct threat defense), or that the services threaten the family's stability (which
suggests that the determination that the parents at issue are "suitable with help"
is incorrect, since the premise is that this is a family for whom services will make
a positive difference). A state might argue that its programs provide only tempo-
rary assistance and that the need for long-term services by some parents with dis-
ability effects a fundamental alteration of its short-term program. However, such
an argument must presuppose that the benefits of the FPS program are of limited
duration, which they are not. See infra Part IV.B.3. It is difficult to postulate a
set of circumstances in which the provision of FPS would "fundamentally alter" the
nature of the program.
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related needs. Restated, the parent seeks modification of the
state's policies to accommodate the disability. 308 In the second in-
stance, the parent most likely claims that he or she requires the
provision of services for longer than the state offers them.30 9 This,
too, may be restated as a request for the modification of the state's
policies; in this case, the parent seeks modification of the dura-
tional component of the state's program. 310 In either case, the in-
quiry for the court's consideration is whether the requested modi-
fication is "reasonable." Most often, the state opposing the
modification will argue that it is either unreasonably expensive
(an "undue burden" claim) or unreasonably dangerous to the chil-
dren (a "direct threat" claim).
2. Defense: Direct Threat
As noted previously, the direct threat defense requires an
"individual[ized] assessment" of the "nature, duration, and sever-
ity" of a risk.311 For a social services agency to argue successfully
that the provision of FPS in a manner that affords an equal benefit
to parents with disabilities would present a risk to any children in
the home is, in essence, for it to argue that its initial determina-
tion that these parents are "suitable with help" was incorrect.
That is, the direct threat defense in this context is the same as ar-
guing that the provision of FPS will not prevent future neglect
(assuming the services are of the appropriate type and duration).
The difficulty in determining whether FPS will make a differ-
308. The most obvious example would be the need for extensive attendant care.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.4.
309. Or, alternatively, the state seeks the removal of the children or the TPR,
claiming that the parental "unfitness" is permanent, even though the "permanent"
(until the children become adults) provision of services would address the parent's
needs. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
310. A third potential posture concerns the "never suitable" parent, wherein the
state claims that it would be unreasonable to modify its policies so as to provide
FPS to individuals that will not benefit from them. However, this Article does not
argue that parents correctly classified as "never suitable" should prevail in any
parents' rights ADA claim. The factual question of whether the parent is "never
suitable" is a threshold question that should be addressed separately, before the
FPS question is addressed. Only if some conceivable FPS would be rehabilitative
(which implies that the parent in question is "suitable with help") should the court
then consider whether modifications necessary to provide those FPS are
"reasonable." See discussion infra Part IV.B.4 (discussing attendant care and
other long-term services).
311. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text (articulating standards
later incorporated into the regulations implementing a "direct threat" defense for




ence312 necessarily becomes a fact-intensive inquiry relying on the
expertise of the evaluator. States and courts must remember,
however, that the Constitution requires clear and convincing evi-
dence that a removal or TPR is necessary. 313 If the jurisdiction re-
quires the provision of FPS before a court may grant a removal or
TPR order,3 14 then the presiding court should not be permitted to
grant such an order when the state has not offered reasonable FPS
to a parent with disability unless the state shows, by clear and
convincing evidence, that such services would be futile.
3. Defense: Undue Burden
The public entity's most obvious defense may be that it can-
not afford to provide the services necessary to keep a family to-
gether, even though such services would prevent future neglect.
There may be a question as to whether this defense exists, and, if
so, what standards apply,315 but a more fundamental issue under-
mines the premise of this claim in most instances. While the na-
ture of the services needed and the associated costs will vary from
312. This is essentially an "evaluation" question. See supra Part III.B.2
(discussing the evaluation of parents with disabilities); supra notes 54-56 and ac-
companying text (discussing categories of parental suitability).
313. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (referring to a Supreme Court
decision interpreting the Constitution to require clear and convincing evidence of
child neglect).
314. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the need for FPS prior to a
TPR order).
315. There is no specific mention of the "undue burden" defense in Title II or its
regulations, save for regulations addressing "Facilities," 28 C.F.R. § 35.150 (1996),
and "Communications," id. § 35.164, which would not apply to the parenting con-
text. However, courts have proceeded as though the "undue burden" defense exists
for all aspects of Title II. See, e.g., Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 338 (3rd Cir.
1995) (analyzing and rejecting an undue burden claim in a Title II action wherein
the plaintiff sought in-home attendant services rather than state's offer of institu-
tional care); Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conf., 913 F. Supp. 663
(D.Conn. 1996) (considering undue burden claim in Title II action against a school
district for prohibiting a student with disability from participating in after-school
sports; court found the burden was not undue); see also supra note 307 (discussing
the "undue burden" and "fundamental alteration" defenses, which may overlap
somewhat in the "parental fitness" context). The Helen L. decision also blurs the
two claims. See 46 F.3d at 337. Analyzing this section under an "undue burden"
label frames the issue most clearly: how much will eliminating the discrimination
cost? Whether Congress intended to permit public entities to avoid providing
services that were expensive if they did not involve physical facility access, but to
require expensive physical access needs, has, apparently, yet to be determined. In
any event, if an "undue burden" defense does not exist for non-facility related dis-
crimination, then parents with disability will not face this hurdle.
If the "undue burden" defense does exist in Title II, then it is likely that the
measure of the burden would include both the financial and administrative costs;
this is how "undue burden" is measured in the context of facilities modifications.
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150 (1996).
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family to family, FPS costs should be balanced against the costs
incurred when the court grants a removal or TPR order. These
latter costs include the extreme financial expense of foster care, 316
which continue to be incurred until the child reaches majority or
becomes adopted, 317 the social costs of the foster care system,3 18
and the staggering social costs of destroying a loving family simply
because parents with disability need help overcoming their dis-
ability. Furthermore, the court's balancing analysis should con-
sider the degree of the deprivation caused by withholding of
FPS.319 One of the most extreme examples of an expensive family
preservation service is that of twenty-four hour attendant care,
such as might be required by paralyzed parents to provide care to
an infant.320 There is evidence, however, that suggests that even
intensive, costly FPS such as this actually save money.321 Ulti-
mately, the question of "undue burden" is a fact-specific inquiry,
with a heavy burden on the defendant public entities to assert suc-
cessfully this defense. 322
316. See Judy Mann, Welfare Cuts: Making the Children Pay, WASH. POST, Dec.
6, 1995, at C26.
317. Adoption becomes increasingly unlikely as the child ages, and is already
very unlikely when the child has a special need, a disability or is a minority. See
ROBERT S. LASNIK, A PARENT'S GUIDE TO ADOPTION 56-66 (1979). Children re-
moved from homes due to neglect or abuse often have significant emotional prob-
lems, making them difficult to place into adoptive homes.
318. See Mann, supra note 316 (describing evidence that children placed in fos-
ter care may have poorer outcomes and consume more public services such as jails,
welfare, health care, and other services, than they would if left in the home, al-
though this evidence is difficult to interpret).
319. See supra Part II.B (arguing for a balancing test under the "undue burden"
defense).
320. This example of expensive FPS has been cited frequently, see, e.g., Ode-
gard, supra note 271. However, it is seldom pointed out that the need for full-time
attendant care diminishes as the child gets older, and eventually subsides com-
pletely well before the child leaves the home. Twenty-four hour attendant care
was at issue in the situations of both Tiffany Callo, see supra notes 33-34 and ac-
companying text, and Leigh Campbell-Earl and Bill Earl, see supra notes 35-37.
Ironically, in most states, a baby or child with disability can qualify for personal
attendant services. See Mathews, supra note 30, at Z12.
321. See Mathews, supra note 30, at Z12. A Santa Clara County, California,
program reported a $1.72 savings for every dollar spent on their intensive FPS
program. See id. These data may not be directly applicable to the question of 24-
hour attendant care for parents with severe disability, but the burden of showing
excessive expense is on the public entity. See infra note 322 and accompanying
text.
322. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150 (1996). If standards similar to those for "Facilities,"
see id., are employed, then a high-level official, no lower than a Department head,
having budgetary authority, will need to certify in writing that all available fund-
ing sources have been investigated without success. See id. This provision would
likely permit an interested court to exercise considerable discretion in reallocating
resources if it believed it necessary to prevent injustice. One need only consider
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States may also argue that the family in question will require
extremely long-term services, perhaps until the children reach the
age of eighteen. However, it must be remembered that the nature
of services required is very likely to change as the children mature,
with expenses varying accordingly. Moreover, the duration of the
provision of necessary services, without more, is an inappropriate
criteria for excluding needy parents from the benefits of family
preservation programs. First, the government's financial burden
might actually be increased by the withholding of FPS if the chil-
dren require support (institutional or foster care) until the age of
majority.323 When the long term and social costs of family destruc-
tion are added, it is not at all clear that limiting FPS to families
needing only "temporary" assistance saves anything.
Second, the goal of FPS programs is to provide the permanent
benefit of keeping the family together. The fact that certain non-
disabled parents might achieve this long-term goal with relatively
short-term services (i.e. parenting classes), while certain parents
with disability might require services over a longer duration to
achieve the exact same long-term goal, is irrelevant. Title II of the
ADA requires non-discriminatory access to the benefits of govern-
ment programs, 324 not non-discriminatory access to mere inclusion
in those programs when the benefits will necessarily remain out of
reach. Sometimes this will force public entities to expend re-
sources for long or indefinite periods of time, but by no means is
this requirement limited to the FPS context. There are countless
circumstances in which it is uncontroverted that public entities
will have to provide permanent, ongoing services to comply with
the ADA. 325 Persons with disability deserve more than just the
one-time expense of a wheelchair ramp to get into the local court-
house; they are entitled to the ongoing expense of the sign-
the reach of the court in Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd
sub norn. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), in which District Judge
Johnson, refusing to accept Alabama's arguments that it had insufficient funds to
provide adequate treatment to the institutionalized mentally ill, compelled the
state to provide the services, and for which,- in part, Judge Johnson earned the
nickname "the real governor of Alabama." Fred Grimm, Judges Are Unsung He-
roes of Rights Era, MIAMI HERALD, May 24, 1987, at IA. The significant liberty
interests of the institutionalized patients in Alabama should be compared with the
arguably comparable liberty interests of parents. See supra Part I. Moreover,
Judge Johnson acted without the guidance and support of a specific statute such as
the ADA.
323. See supra note 321.
324. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132; see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT: TITLE 11 TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL 10-12 (1993).
325. For example, qualified interpreters will "usually" or "likely" be necessary in
such settings as municipal hospital emergency rooms and state and local courts.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 324, at 39.
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language interpreter to permit them to participate once they have
gained entrance. This is not to suggest that states are subject to
all manner of unlimited, permanent expense. They may claim,
when supported by the specific factual context, the existence of an
"undue burden," or they may redesign their FPS programs to pro-
vide equal benefits to parents with and without disability while
avoiding such permanent expense. A state does not violate the
ADA when it makes public policy decisions based on legitimate
non-discriminatory criteria. A state does violate the ADA when it
refuses to provide effective assistance to its parents with disability
but does provide effective assistance to its nondisabled parents,
regardless of the duration that assistance would be required.
4. Note: Attendant Care and Other Long-Term Services
The regulations implementing the ADA specifically exclude
"personal services," 326 which may seem to excuse a public entity
when it refuses to provide services, such as attendant care, in a
way that discriminates on the basis of disability. However, these
regulations should be read as clarifying that the ADA does not cre-
ate a requirement that a public entity provide personal services. If
a right to personal services is created by another law or practice,
the ADA should be interpreted as requiring that those services be
provided in a non-discriminatory way. There is no evidence to
support the premise that Congress intended to permit the dis-
criminatory provision of any services, personal or otherwise. Any
other interpretation of the rule would allow a state to create a pro-
gram that includes personal services but permits the program to
exclude persons with disability,3 27 a result wholly inconsistent
with the overall purpose of the ADA: to provide for "the elimina-
tion of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 328 Two
student notes have addressed this question and both concluded
that the ADA may indeed require the provision of attendant care
services to parents with disability. 329
326. "This part does not require a public entity to provide to individuals with
disabilities... services of a personal nature including assistance in eating, toilet-
ing, or dressing." 28 C.F.R. § 35.135 (1996).
327. For example, a state might create a program to assist its elderly citizens by
sending workers to check on them periodically and provide them with personal
services, such as help with bathing. Such a program would be beneficial and
laudatory, and would not implicate the ADA. However, if the state decided that
the same program did not apply to its elderly citizens with mental retardation, be-
cause "they take too long to bathe," the program would violate the ADA. A differ-
ent interpretation of the statute would be illogical.
328. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
329. See Odegard, supra note 271 (addressing physical disability); Chris Wat-
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A court of appeals decision also addressed the question of
whether the ADA can ever require the provision of attendant
services. In Helen L. v. DiDario,330 residents sued the state of
Pennsylvania after the state refused to provide attendant care
services in the home (even though it had a program to provide
such in-home services) and instead required the plaintiffs to reside
in nursing homes to receive care.3 3 1 The state conceded that the
average yearly cost of caring for a resident of a nursing home was
$45,000, of which $19,800 was borne by the State, while the aver-
age yearly cost of the in-home attendant care sought by the plain-
tiffs was $10,500, borne entirely by the state. 332 Still the State
claimed "a justification of administrative convenience to resist an
accommodation which would save an average of $34,500 per year,
[and] would allow Idell S. to live at home with her children."33 3 Al-
though the State argued that the ADA did not require
"deinstitutionalization" rather than arguing that the ADA did not
require attendant care services, 334 the court's analysis is relevant
to both claims. "Idell S. is not asserting a right to community care
or deinstitutionalization per se. She properly concedes that [the
state] is under no obligation to provide her with any care at all."335
However, the court held that, because the state had a program
-that could provide the plaintiffs with in-home care, it could not op-
erate that program in a discriminatory manner, and vacated the
district court's order of summary judgment for the State, taking
the unusual step of directing the district court to enter an order of
summary judgment for the plaintiffs rather than remanding for
additional fact-finding. 336 In other words, the ADA does not re-
quire public entities to create attendant care programs, but it may
require attendant care if that is a reasonable means of providing to
kins, Beyond Status: The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Parental Rights
of People Labeled Developmentally Disabled or Mentally Retarded, 83 CAL. L. REV.
1415 (1995) (addressing mental disability).
330. 46 F.3d 325 (3rd Cir. 1995).
331. See id. Tragically, at least one of the plaintiffs, Idell S., was forced to leave
her children so that she could receive care in the nursing home. See id. She had
contracted meningitis which left her paralyzed from the waist down and reduced
her ability to care for herself. See id. at 328. According to the opinion, "[t]he par-
ties agree that, although Idell S. is not capable of fully independent living, she is
not so incapacitated that she needs the custodial care of a nursing home." Id.
332. See id. at 329.
333. Id. at 338.
334. See id. at 327-39 (relating that the state did not argue 28 C.F.R. § 35.135
(1996)).
335. Helen L., 46 F.3d at 336.
336. See id. The plaintiffs' principal legal claim was that the ADA required the
state to provide services in the "most integrated setting appropriate." Id. at 336.
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persons with disability the benefits of a program created under
some other authority.
A primary objection to requiring the provision of attendant
care for parents with disability is that such an "entitlement" need
make no distinction among the analytical categories of parents.3
37
That is, all child neglect theoretically could be eliminated if states
simply placed attendants with all at-risk families. For example,
one state social services spokesman said "[i]f we could provide 24-
hour home care for [parents with disability], any parent in trouble
would want 24-hour home care, and we can't afford it.'' 38 How-
ever, this concern may be addressed in three ways. First, public
entities are free under the ADA to offer to persons with disability
programs that are not offered to persons without disability; thus,
public entities are free to provide attendant care services exclu-
sively to parents with disability.3 39 Second, the "undue burden"
defense may be available if the state can demonstrate that it really
"cannot afford" to provide attendant care. Third, and most impor-
tantly, the courts would still need to consider whether an atten-
dant would merely assist in parenting the child, or whether the at-
tendant would instead become the de facto "parent." That is,
attendant care is only appropriate for parents in the "suitable with
help" category. 340 Although an attendant might prevent neglect in
the home of a "never suitable" parent, such a parent is still "never
suitable." Mandating attendant care for a parent who will never
be able to raise his or her child in any meaningful way would not
be a "reasonable modification" under the ADA, and should not be
required of a state. 341 Again, proper categorization of a parent
337. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing analytical catego-
ries of parents based on parental abilities).
338. Mathews, supra note 30, at Z12 (quoting a Michigan social services
spokesman referring to Leigh Campbell-Earl and Bill Earl).
339. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(c) (1996). 'Nothing in this part prohibits a public
entity from providing benefits, services, or advantages to individuals with disabili-
ties, or to a particular class of individuals with disabilities beyond those required
by this part." Id. "[Public entities] may provide special benefits ... that are lim-
ited to individuals with disabilities or a particular class of individuals with dis-
abilities, without thereby incurring additional obligations to persons without dis-
abilities or to other classes of individuals with disabilities." ADA HANDBOOK,
supra note 142, at 11-39 (1991) (explaining 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(c)).
340. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing analytical catego-
ries of parents based on parenting abilities).
341. Thus, a quadriplegic couple who needs help with a child should be provided
attendant care before the state moves to remove the children. A profoundly re-
tarded couple, however, needing more than "help" would be ineligible if the atten-
dant, in fact, would actually be raising the child. The obvious difficulties in distin-
guishing between these extremes in closer cases would need to be considered by
courts based on all the facts available at the time of a decision. This is essentially
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with disability is crucial to an effective ADA analysis and requires
a careful examination of all the pertinent facts.
Finally, the ADA does not simply require states to provide at-
tendant care under all circumstances. This Article argues that the
ADA may require such a service when appropriate as part of a
comprehensive FPS program (which may itself be required under
state law or as part of the AA&CWA). The ADA does not create
the requirement for any FPS, but it does create the requirement
that any FPS be provided in a non-discriminatory fashion. Atten-
dant care may well be required to avoid discrimination, since it
may be the only effective method to provide FPS to parents with
disabilities, 342 but states are not required by the ADA to provide
any FPS unless they so choose.
C. The Real Issue: How to Effectuate the ADA
Regardless of how the ADA may affect a state's family pres-
ervation obligations, the question of greatest importance for par-
ents with disabilities involved in a TPR proceeding is whether the
ADA can be used to attack the TPR proceeding directly. In other
words, if the state's FPS programs have discriminated against
parents with disabilities in violation of the ADA, can the violation
be used as a defense in a TPR hearing? The answer to this ques-
tion depends on the state's laws, but in most cases should be an-
swered "yes." If the state requires the provision of FPS,343 or re-
quires that FPS be provided in a particular way,344 then before a
court may terminate a parent's rights to a child, it should incorpo-
the same decision as deciding whether a parent is "suitable with help" or "never
suitable." See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (discussing analytical
categories of parents based on parenting abilities).
342. When pressed, states may be able to fashion effective FPS that meet the
needs of parents with disabilities in ways other than providing attendant care.
For example, in the absence of effective FPS, the state will almost always be obli-
gated to remove the children from the home and place them in foster care at con-
siderable expense. One possibility for states would be to create foster family pro-
grams that accept parents with disabilities and their children; some states have
similar programs for teenage mothers. The burdens on foster parents might be
less than if they accepted sole responsibility for the children, and if the parents
with disability are able to contribute economically, the financial expenses might
also be lessened. It is likely that more creative solutions to the problems faced by
parents with disability would be developed if the ADA is interpreted as requiring
such efforts.
343. A state might be obligated to provide FPS either under its own laws or in
order to become eligible for federal assistance under the AA&CWA. See supra note
282 and accompanying text.
344. For example, Wisconsin requires "diligent effort" to provide services. See
In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that "diligent
effort" means "reasonable, earnest and energetic effort .... ").
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rate the ADA's anti-discrimination requirements. Thus, a state
requiring the provision of "reasonable" family services prior to is-
suing a TPR order should find a violation of the ADA in the provi-
sion of those services to be per se "unreasonable" and refuse to is-
sue the TPR order. The court should issue a TPR order after
finding discrimination in the provision of FPS only if the court is
permitted to issue a TPR order in the complete absence of any
FPS, or if the court is permitted to issue the order under circum-
stances that amount to a complete absence of FPS.345 Moreover,
the court should consider whether the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act (AA&CWA)346 also affects the requirement that
services be provided.347 In other words, the court should find that
any violation of the ADA in the provision of FPS is a per se viola-
tion of the AA&CWA, and should address the situation accord-
ingly. 348
Several state courts have addressed the discriminatory provi-
sion of FPS to TPR proceedings, but those actually considering the
effects of an ADA violation 349 suffer from problems in their analy-
345. This might be the case under a statute that does not mention FPS, or
makes their provision completely within the court's discretion. Even under these
circumstances, however, parents could argue that FPS are a requirement if the
state receives federal money under the AA&CWA.
346. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
347. The question of whether a violation of the requirements of the AA&CWA
can invalidate a TPR order is a matter of state law interpretation, and has been
litigated. See, e.g., Matter of Burns, 519 A.2d 638 (Del. 1986) (invalidating a TPR
order after finding that the Division of Child Protective Services had not complied
with the requirements of the AA&CWA); see also Division of Child Protective Serv.
v. Doran, 529 A-2d 765 (Del. Fain. Ct. 1987) (interpreting Burns to require Dela-
ware courts to determine whether Child Protective Services complied with
AA&CWA). The AA&CWA requires that state plans "be in effect in all political
subdivisions of the State... [and] be mandatory upon them." 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(3)
(1995). The "mandatory upon them" language should compel state courts to en-
force all elements of the approved FPS plan.
348. If violating the AA&CWA would invalidate a TPR order in that state, then
a violation of the ADA in the provision of FPS should also invalidate a TPR order.
While the Supreme Court has held that there is no private cause of action under
the AA&CWA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the "reasonable effects" provisions,
there could be a private cause of action under the "mandatory upon them" lan-
guage for state actions that contradict their own FPS plans. See generally Suter v.
Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992) (suggesting that states may be liable if state actions
contradict their own FPS plans, but holding that a state's failure to use
"reasonable efforts" to maintain intact families may not give rise to an action un-
der the AA&CWA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Also, the ADA and the AA&CWA taken
together might create a § 1983 cause of action for discriminatory state action in
the FPS context.
349. Some of the decisions found the provision of the FPS not to have been dis-
criminatory; thus, analysis of the effect of an ADA violation was unnecessary. See
In the Interest of C.M., 526 N.W.2d 562 (Ia. 1994); In re Angel B., 659 A.2d 277
(Me. 1993); In re Welfare of A.J.R., 896 P.2d 1298 (Wash. 1995) (each holding that
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ses. For example, in In re Torrance p.,350 the court held that the
ADA did not "affect [the] inquiry of whether the County made a
diligent effort [as required by state law] to provide [the plaintiff]
with court-ordered services."3 51 Instead, the court decided that the
discriminatory provision of FPS was "a separate inquiry under the
ADA, unrelated to the TPR proceedings."352 This illogical conclu-
sion forces parents with disabilities who seek a remedy, first to
suffer discrimination, then to lose their children, then to seek legal
representation, and finally, to seek any available remedy under
the ADA. 353 No ADA remedy can restore the family following the
issuance of a TPR order, and therefore the In re Torrance P. court's
reasoning would permit the continued destruction of families
whose only fault has been to be headed by parents with disability.
The plaintiff in In re Torrance P., a father with a developmental
disability, had his rights to his two children terminated after he
failed to fulfill the conditions imposed upon him by the court for
the return of his children.354 Among his most notable offenses was
that he "failed to keep the County apprised of his address."355 The
caseworker assigned to facilitate the plaintiffs reunion with his
children testified that she repeatedly mailed permanency planning
and hearing notices to his last known address. However, she was
unaware that the plaintiff was unable to read. The court, in
making its decision, relied upon the lack of evidence that the
plaintiffs inability to read had deprived him of the ability to un-
derstand the correspondence. 356 According to the court, the Wis-
consin law requiring "diligent efforts" to provide court-ordered
services prior to a TPR order is unaffected by the ADA. 357 Dili-
gence is defined, in Wisconsin, as a "reasonable, earnest and ener-
getic effort such as is customarily exercised by other departments
under the same or similar circumstances,"358 and the "ADA does
not increase those responsibilities or dictate how . . .[they] must
consideration of the effects of an ADA violation was unnecessary because the FPS
programs at issue did not discriminate).
350. In re Torrance P. 522 N.W.2d 243 (Wisc. 1994).
351. Id. at 246.
352. Id.
353. Remedies under Title II are mostly limited to equitable forms of relief,
which are totally inadequate in addressing the loss of a child unless they include
the invalidation of a TPR order. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
354. See 522 N.W. 2d at 245.
355. Id.
356. See id.




be discharged." 359 Under this reasoning, then, diligence presuma-
bly is unrelated to discrimination or to the making of reasonable
accommodations so long as discrimination is "customarily exer-
cised by other departments."3 60 Surely, Congress intended no such
result. The court in In re Torrance P. did not address the issue of
whether the caseworker's ignorance of the plaintiffs illiteracy
might have had an impact on its finding of "diligent efforts."
This faulty reasoning361 was followed by an Indiana court, in
Stone v. Daviess County Division of Children and Family Serv-
ices.362 The court, citing In re Torrance P., agreed that an ADA
violation was a separate inquiry from a TPR proceeding.363 The
Stone court observed that whereas the Wisconsin TPR scheme at
issue in In re Torrance P. required the provision of FPS, Indiana
laws had no such requirement. 364 The court reasoned, therefore,
that any alleged ADA violation was irrelevant to an Indiana TPR
proceeding. 365 The Stone court did not address any possible effect
of the AA&CWA, which, as noted above, could be interpreted as
creating a FPS requirement in Indiana if the state receives federal
funds regardless of state law. The Stone court also did not recon-
cile its assertion that the Wisconsin TPR scheme in In re Torrance
P. did require the provision of FPS with the In re Torrance P.
court's own disregard for any discrimination in the provision of
FPS. The Stone court accepted the In re Torrance P. court's con-
clusion that a violation of the ADA in the discriminatory provision
of FPS is not a barrier to a TPR order. 366
No reported opinion has yet accepted the notion that the ADA
creates an obligation on the states to provide FPS in a non-
discriminatory fashion. 367 Ignoring for the present discussion the
difficulties in deciding what constitutes non-discriminatory FPS,
the question remains what the court should do if it finds that the
state has in fact discriminated in its family preservation efforts.
The In re Torrance P. court, and therefore, presumably, the Stone
359. Id.
360. Id. at 245.
361. This Article argues that the reasoning was incorrect. However, under the
facts as presented in In re Torrance P., the final result of terminating the parent's
rights may have been correct.
362. 656 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
363. See id at 829.
364. See id at 830.
365. See id.
366. See id.
367. But cf. In re C.M., 526 N.W.2d 562, 566 (Ia. Ct. App. 1994) (suggesting in
dicta that an ADA violation may be applicable to TPR proceedings).
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court, based its conclusions on the belief that "Congress did not in-
tend [the ADA] to change the obligations imposed by unrelated
statutes."3 68 The only authority cited in In re Torrance P. for this
proposition is the ADA "purposes" clause, which states, inter alia,
that "[iut is the purpose of this Act ... to invoke the sweep of con-
gressional authority ... in order to address the major areas of dis-
crimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities."3 69 The
"purposes" clause includes no provision sparing state statutes,
whether related or unrelated. Moreover, the extremely broad lan-
guage of the ADA coupled with Congress' imputed knowledge of
the Supreme Court's steadfast protection of parents' rights, leads
to the conclusion that Congress did intend to affect statutes that
might permit or promote the discriminatory termination of par-
ents' rights. In fact, the evidence indicates that Congress did in-
tend to impact "unrelated" statutes, and in fact all state actions,
judicial, legislative, or otherwise, to eradicate discrimination by
state and local governments against persons with disability. 370
If Congress had intended the ADA to exempt courts or legis-
latures from its otherwise very broad scope, it easily could have
done so. Nowhere in the legislative history of the Act does it ap-
pear that Congress meant to exempt any government activities,
save those granted specific defenses within the Act. On the con-
trary, the commentary accompanying the regulations implement-
ing Title II clearly states that "Title II of the ADA extends this
prohibition of discrimination to include all services, programs, and
activities provided or made available by state and local govern-
ments or any of their.., agencies." 371 A court faced with a petition
to terminate a parent's rights, must, if it finds discrimination in
the provision of required FPS, refuse to grant the petition unless
one of the statutory defenses applies.
368. In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d at 246 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994),
the "purposes" clause of the ADA).
369. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994).
370. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987) (interpreting the Reha-
bilitation Act as reflecting Congress' concern with protecting the handicapped
against discrimination stemming not only from simple prejudice, but also from ar-
chaic attitudes and laws) (citing S. Rep. No. 93-1297, at 50 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6400). The legislative history reflects no intent to limit the
ADA more than the Rehab Act. Thus, if the Rehab Act intends to affect "archaic
attitudes and laws," so must the ADA.
371. ADA HANDBOOK, supra note 142, at 11-9 (analyzing 42 C.F.R. § 35.102
(1996)); see supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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D. Conclusion: TPR, Parents with Disabilities, and the
ADA
The impact of the ADA on states' child removal and TPR laws
depends, in part, on whether the state requires that FPS be pro-
vided before a court may issue a removal or TPR order. This in-
quiry also implicates provisions of the AA&CWA. States that do
provide FPS, whether by mandate or option, must provide those
services in a manner that does not violate the ADA.372 In many
cases, this may require states to rethink their entire FPS program,
because the ADA extends to parents with disability the right to
expect parenting assistance that is equally effective as that pro-
vided to nondisabled parents. This may include assistance in the
form of personal services, attendant care, and other "novel" forms
of FPS. Moreover, in those states in which a TPR order must be
preceded by FPS, either because of state law or the AA&CWA, so-
cial services which discriminate against parents with disabilities
violate the ADA and should serve as grounds for a defense against
the TPR proceeding.
Conclusion
The ADA empowers persons with disabilities, primarily by
expanding their options for legal recourse. Through litigation, or
the threat of litigation, the victims of disability discrimination may
protect their rights to "full participation"8 73 on an "equal basis" 374
in society. This empowerment extends to parents and prospective
parents whose possibilities to have and raise children are threat-
ened. Still needed, however, are additional data on how parents
with disabilities raise their children, how their children adapt to
differences in parenting abilities, and how evaluations of parental
ability can avoid prejudice and discrimination. Empowered with
the added strength of good data, parents with disabilities would be
able to expand on the ADA's present promise: the power to per-
suade-and if necessary, force--doctors and other ARTs providers,
372. This Article accepts the proposition that the ADA does not itself require
the provision of FPS. The ADA guarantees nondiscrimination in all state and local
services, programs and benefits. It does not require states to create or maintain
services, programs or benefits to neutralize the effects of disability. The ADA, for
example, may not require the state to provide its citizens with libraries, but if it
chooses to do so, the state must make those libraries accessible to all its citizens
(except when such accessibility would fall within one of the ADA's defenses).
373. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8).
374. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9).
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adoption "evaluators," and state social service agencies to concen-
trate on parenting abilities instead of stereotypical assumptions
and prejudices "not truly indicative of. . . individual ability."3 75
Through this promise, the ADA has brought to parents with dis-
abilities new opportunities for the pursuit of happiness.
375. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
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